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ABSTRACT 
 
 
TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND UNDERSECRETARIAT 
FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
 
Kızmaz, Efsun 
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor:Prof.Dr.Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu  
September 2007 
 
This thesis analyzed the development of Turkish defense industry and the 
functions of Undersecreatiat for Defense Industry. First, the evolution of 
defense industries in the world and today’s prospects of these industries were 
analyzed. Second, the historical background and today’s situation of Turkish 
defense industry, Turkish procurement process were examined. Third, the role 
of Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, its legal basis, and its composition 
were analyzed. It is concluded that Turkish defense industry will be able to 
produce unique software systems through substantial governmental support. 
Moreover, SSM is a must both Turkish defense industry and for Turkey’s 
democratic features. 
 
Keywords: Defense Industry, Procurement, Offset, Weapon Systems, Export, 
R&D, Military, Turkey, Undersecretariat for Defense Industries. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRK SAVUNMA SANAYİİ VE SAVUNMA SANAYİİ 
MÜSTEŞARLIĞI  
 
Kızmaz, Efsun 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof.Dr.Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu  
Eylül 2007 
 
Bu tez çalışması Türk savunma sanayiini ve Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığını 
incelemektedir. Birinci bölümde, Dünya’daki savunma sanayiilerinin gelişimi 
ve sözkonusu sanayiilerin bugünkü durumu ele alınmıştır.  İkinci bölümde ise 
Türkiye’deki savunma sanayiinin tarihsel gelişimi ve günümüz Türk savunma 
sanayiinin sorunları ve başarıları analiz edildi.  Ayrıca ikinci bölümde 
Türkiye’deki tedarik sistemi anlatıldı. Son olarak Savunma Sanayii 
Müsteşarlığı’nın yasal statüsü, işleyişi, savunma sanayii ile ilgili olarak 
uyguladığı politikalar ve projeler  incelendi.  Sonuç olarak Türk savunma 
sanayiinin devlet desteğiyle özgün sistemler üretebileceği ve SSM’nın hem 
Türkiye’nin demokratik özelliği hem de Türk savunma sanayiinin gelişimi için 
gerekli bir kuruluş olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma Sanayii, Asker, Tedarik, Offset, Silah Sistemleri, 
İhracat, Ar&Ge, Türkiye, Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
                                                INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The production and upgrading of weapon systems have always been one 
of the most significant occupations of the modern state. The organization –and 
reorganization- of the defense industry according to changing international 
circumstance and threat perceptions is a matter of vital state interest. This special 
branch of industry has several peculiarities. First, its market is limited mainly to 
the states, and in certain cases, to a single state only. Second, the market is not 
usually regulated by liberal economic norms. Third the market is usually, 
dominated by high-risk factors. Finally, industrial projects depend heavily on 
Research and Development (R&D) and high technology more than in most of the 
other branches of industry. This characteristic of defense industry makes 
production a highly expensive undertaking. This thesis intends to examine 
Turkey’s defense industry by referring to these problematic aspects as well as the 
institutions and ways developed to deal with them.  
Chapter two of this thesis is devoted to the general aspects of defense 
industries and procurement policies and historical evolution of defense industries 
in general with special reference to the United States, Soviet Union, France, and  
Brazil. This study has provided me with the opportunity to observe and 
understand the problems in fully industrialized countries as well as in a 
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developing country such as Brazil which has already made a certain progress in 
the sector. Moreover, this chapter also examines the impact of globalization on 
defense industries.  
Chapter three traces the evolution of Turkish defense industries from the 
Ottoman Empire to the post-Cold War era. The same chapter extrapolates the 
specific problems that Turkish governments are facing and the prospects of 
defense industries in Turkey. Besides, defense market in Turkey, Turkish 
procurement policies are also analyzed in this chapter.  
The liberalization of the Turkish economy in the 1980s requires a 
reorganization of the defense industry. This led to the establishment of the 
Undersecretariat For Defense Industries, a new institution that planned to manage 
production and procurement, and the role of the state in defense industries. The 
Undersecretariat and its activities have introduced a radical change in Turkish 
defense industry. I therefore believe that it deserves a detailed examination in a 
separate chapter. The Undersecretariat For Defense Industries brought about a 
certain degree of civilianization of the defense industry. Within that context, I will 
also examine the role of the military in the decision making process concerning 
production and procurement of weapon systems.  
I do not intend to make a theoretical study. My purpose in writing this 
thesis is not to prove or disprove a given theory. The reader should not expect 
from this thesis any efforts on my part for the refinement of a given theoretical  
framework. My approach to the topic of this study is purely descriptive. My 
purpose is to make an account of the evolution of Turkey’s defense industry, 
including the novelties introduced in the 1980s and their implementation, and the 
problems that Turkish governments have so far faced and are to face in the years 
 2
to come. This approach, I believe, will elucidate the transformative reforms and 
their contributions to the development of defense industries.  
My research has mainly relied on Turkish and English language sources. 
As a preliminary basic reading, I used general books and articles and I based the 
preparation of the Second Chapter together with several brief country studies on 
them. The books written by Jacques Gansler and Michael Brozska helped me to 
comprehend defense industry literature. Moreover, articles written by Ethan 
Kapstein and Raul de Gouvea Neto, were used to analyze French and Brazilian 
defense industries. For chapter 3 and 4, I mostly used the Turkish sources such as 
military periodicals mainly Savunma ve Havacılık, newspaper articles mainly 
Turkish Daily News, published official documents and interviews with 
government officials as well as a few interviews that I realized with experts.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN THE  
 
WORLD 
 
 
 
The ultimate aim of the state has been to protect its population, national 
independence and territorial integrity. After the Westphalian Treaty (1648), by 
which each “nation-state”  began to respect each other’s sovereignity, states began 
looking at the means to fulfill these principles. These have included a standing 
army and also high-tech weapons to counter perceived threats. The maintenance 
of defense industry is always the ultimate aim of state.   
Defense industries and defense economics are among the major fields in 
which states formulate their policies. In this chapter, I will first discuss the basic 
aspects of defense industries. I will then focus on the historical evolution of 
defense industries, especially during the Cold War. Finally I will examine the 
development of defense industries in the post-Cold War era. 
 
2.1. An Overview of Defense Industries and Procurement Policies 
The defense industry has always been of major importance for states’ 
survival. A state, irrespective of its economic system, always has a say in the 
process of arms production. Moreover, states have often owned major defense 
 4
firms despite their economic regime. In this section, I will study the relationship 
between state and defense industry, and will also look at the issue of whether or 
not cooperation with other states is an option.  
 
2.1.1. The Relationship between State and Defense Industry  
Defense industry was defined by Gansler as follows: “[T]his industry 
embraces industrial sectors that unequivocally manufacture military goods, but by 
large it includes sectors that produce goods.”1 The nature of product has 
inevitably led states to intervene in the defense market. Moreover, government is 
the only buyer of this product, and defense is a public good2 which means that 
there is only one producer of that military good and that society will benefit from 
this regulation. The specification of the equipment to be produced is determined 
by the ministries of defense or by other bureaucratic organizations.3 Another 
reason for government intervention is that in order for companies to invest in 
high-risk projects at the cutting edge of technology, the government needs to 
subsidize firms to keep defense market alive. Moreover, the arms industry should, 
ideally, produce high-tech weapon systems. In this case, the technology that the 
state receives will also be beneficial for other industrial sectors, and thus defense 
industries serve as the locomotive power of the economy. In other words, it will 
“[e]xploit the ascribed economic and technological benefits of arms production.”4   
Moreover, private firms, if there is no guarantee about winning contract, than will 
be hesitant to invest much more on R&D. States, that places importance on high-
                                                 
1 Daniel Todd. Defense Industries: A Global Perspective (Routledge:London, 1988). pp. 18-19. 
2 A public good is a good that is hard or even impossible to produce for private profit, because the 
market fails to account for its large beneficial externalities. 
3 Ethan B. Kapstein. The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective. (McGraw 
Hill: New York, 1992)  
4 Michael Brozska. Restructuring of Arms Production in the Western Europe. (Oxford Press: 
England, 1992) p. 35. 
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technology should, therefore subsidize defense firms. As a result, government 
support, or government desire to produce more guns, questions of defense 
budgeting will arise.   
A state’s support of its defense industry obviously involves the question of 
finance. The size of a defense budget in proportion to the national economy varies 
from one country to another, according to a given state’s political and cultural 
values. For example, while European powers focus on the economic side of 
weapons procurement, the United States emphasizes the quality of weapons rather 
than their cost. Budgets are also shaped according to states’ perceived national 
security needs. If a country perceives itself as being in a dangerous position, then 
its defense expenditures will most likely increase. For example, Israel devotes 30 
per cent of its GNP to defense5. Defense budgeting is not only a domestic, but 
also an international issue.6 The classical notion of “guns vs. butter” has been a 
main issue in the course of determining defense budgets. The reason that high 
defense budgets are frequently criticized is that the devotion of scarce resources to 
non-productive assets such as tanks, artilleries and the like will cause restriction 
in other areas, such as a state’s social welfare programs. The regime type also 
affects the opportunity costs of defense for social benefits7..  
 
2.1.2. Arms Procurement and the Need for a Special Agency 
It is generally agreed that  arms procurement should be based on 
efficiency, which “[is] about eliminating  ‘waste’ and improving ‘value for 
money’ by lowering program costs and/or duration without buying fewer and less 
                                                 
5 Stewart Reiser. The Israeli Defense Industry. (Holmes&Myer: New York, 1989). p. 50. 
6 Kapstein. The Political Economy of National Security. p.38. 
7 David Dabelko& James M. McCormick, “Opportunity Costs of Defense: Cross National 
Evidence” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 16(1977) pp.145-154. 
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complicated items.”8 However, procurement process cannot be easily detached 
from the political process.  It is not a science in which there are rules concerning 
desired outcomes. Moreover, decision-makers in the area of defense often do not 
have sufficiently extensive knowledge to deal with the effective outcomes of their 
decisions. “If decision-makers with no special knowledge are offered a narrow 
range of choices or if they are offered partial information by experts who have 
their own policy preferences, they are not able to make an informed choice. This 
is a process failure.”9
As a means of providing such expertise within the defense production and 
procurement process, specialized agencies were set up in a number of states. 
These agencies which are not fully under the purview of the military, serve as 
intermediaries between finance ministries, defense ministries and trade ministries.  
They try to play the “efficiency game in the town”. However, they do not have 
full power to make final decisions concerning armament. Procurement agencies 
should be subordinated to the civil authority in order to have power on the 
decision-making process, which will provide them with the ability to influence 
trade-off packages.  
Another function of such procurement agencies is to provide the military 
needs. Sometimes, the military issues only general requirements. In this case, the 
arms procurement agency will, by getting professional advice from the armed 
forces, try to determine exactly what equipment is needed and obtain it in a cost-
effective manner. However, the relative impact of agency on the force structure 
can be changed by the decisions about which products are to be procured. 
                                                 
8 Ian Anthony, “Arms Procurement after the Cold War: How Much is Enough to Do What”. 
International Affairs. Vol. 74-4 (1998) pp. 871-882. 
9 Ibid. p. 875. 
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Besides, the final decisions on major issues of arms procurement, such as those 
concerning long-term programs and their modifications, depend on the ministry of 
defense.  As Anthony mentioned 
  
[R]elationship between the agency and the military can also be affected by 
the extent to which a procurement agency is staffed by military officers on 
secondment10 and the extent to which the agency employs either a special 
cadre of officers trained equipment procurement or civilian specialists.11  
 
Another aspect of arms procurement is the relationship with the industry, 
which some say should be based on ‘rational customer’ policy. The critical part of 
a weapon or highly sophisticated weapon system is manufactured by a company, 
which was previously selected by the state. In addition to this, there is a general 
preference for producing these critical parts or systems within the state concerned 
rather than importing them. The producer company is designated as a 
“main/national prime contractorship” as determined by the state. In this process, 
liberal market policies are not applicable. There is no competition to determine 
the national prime contractorship. In this area, states do not leave the ultimate 
decision to the industry, in order to protect its strategic interests. 
 
2.1.2.1.  Procurement Options 
There have been several options for states to procure weapons. However, 
each options have pros and cons for the economic structure of states and 
technological feature of defense industrial bases. If the equipment is procured 
from the domestic industry, the possibility of extra costs exists. The production of 
complex weapons in the domestic market is beneficial in terms of the structuring 
                                                 
10 Secondment means the detachment of a person from their regular organization for temporary 
assignment elsewhere 
11 Ibid. p. 879. 
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of the country’s defense base (savings in R&D process, and employment within 
the nation in question), albeit in an expensive way. Nevertheless, the production 
of complex weapon systems is a costly and long-term development, which must 
be supported by the customer. This process is also a risky one.  
Another procurement option is licensing or co-production. In this process, 
the country can co-produce with the supplier one, or produce by means of a 
license. For example, in general, European countries purchased the US goods by 
this way during the Cold War. This method is particularly helpful to those 
countries that have fewer resources and no ambition to produce high-tech 
weapons. However, this type of procurement method has limitations. For 
example, licensed production helped the United States to control technology 
exports. There is also the possibility of delaying commitment until production 
begins. Moreover, the buyer depends on the supplier for high technologies. Such 
dependence could limit the buyer’s advances in technology. For example, US 
products cannot be exported to third countries. This requirement was set up by US 
government to give it a say in the buyer country’s exports and to control arms 
transfers. Although the buyer may want to export its specified part of the project, 
the United States can still have the power to restrict the sale for political and 
economic reasons. As a result of this, co-production is much more costly than 
direct sales. For example, the co-production of F-16 jetfighters, with the 
participation of four European countries, cost 34% more than direct sales from the 
United States. Such US participation did not satisfy the European customers, and 
this is why they turned to producing their own weapons.  
The third option is international collaboration. Stated briefly, it refers to 
the agreement between states to develop weapons separately and to buy from each 
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other. However, this approach has not totally eliminated the problems of 
procurement collaboration. There is still disagreement over the requirements of 
the military and international collaboration is still done on a project basis. 
 
2.1.3. Technology in the Defense Industry 
 In the defense industry literature is there has been much more emphasis 
on technology or R&D in arms procurement. High-tech weapons have been the 
most demanded type of arms. However, sustaining such high-tech weapons has 
not been so an easy task. States devote a considerable amount of resources to 
R&D, or else import this technology and become dependent on the exporter. 
Apart from that, the R&D costs for any weapon will obviously increase the 
overall cost of the weapon. The financial effect of R&D can be explained as 
follows: 
 
[W]ith each particular weapon system, a larger sum of R&D has to be 
recovered. Second, without proportional increases in weapons budgets, R&D 
absorbs a growing proportion of the available resources. Third, this decrease 
in numbers causes further cumulative price increases because ‘economies of 
scale’ are of considerable magnitude in arms industry, particularly since there 
is decreasing ‘learning costs’ associated with the production. The cost of the 
first item produced is much higher than that of the 100th, which in turn is 
higher than that of the 1000th12. 
 
 
Another aspect of technology and arms industry is that the prospect of 
government intervention is the highest in this area. The reason for this centralized 
trend is that it leads to the “[p]olitical protection of key technology whose control 
is needed if the state wants to pursue of the strategy of keeping ahead with 
                                                 
12 Michael Brzoska&Peter Lock  “The Western European Armament” in ed. by. Michael Brzoska, 
The Restructuring of Western Europe,  (Oxford Press: England, 1992)   
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mercantilism.”13 This kind of mercantilism entails the state relying on domestic 
resources to build an indigenous arms industry and to decrease expenses by 
means of an active export policy. Moreover, the state has the power to block the 
export of its high-tech weapons to prevent adversaries, from acquiring new 
technologies. The present mercantilist trend impedes competitiveness and slows 
down the development of new technologies.  
There has always been a relationship between civil and military 
technologies. Besides, the possibility of the diversion of military into civil 
technology exists. If the economy of a country is in need of upgraded technology, 
and cannot import from the outside, it could “spin-off”. Military industries could 
spin-off to civilian industries14, and vice versa. When spin-off happens, it can be 
assumed that “military production is not only for the national security needs, but 
[spin-off] also contributes to economic development”15.  The process of “spin-
on”, on the other hand, occurs when civilian technology fosters new military 
applications. 
Advances in technology, or reduction in the costs of R&D could both be 
accomplished through international cooperation. Moreover, when military 
systems become more complex, individual states are not able to produce those 
systems by themselves. “Second, as complexity has increased and the time factor 
in the development of new systems has lengthened, the demands upon expertise 
and the skills of the aviation, armaments and electronic industries have grown”16. 
                                                 
13 Raimo Voyrynen Military Industrulization and Economic Development: Theory and Historical 
Case Studies. (UNIDIR:Dartmouth, 199) p. 18.  
14 A good example will be the Internet, which was developed during the Second World War, by 
the US army, in order to find a new telecommunication system. 
15 Ibid. p.23. 
16 Stanley Sienkiewcz, “Technology Transfer Policy and Export Control Practice” in ed. by. Ethan 
Kapstein Global Arms Production: For the Policy Dilemmas of 1990s. (University Press of 
America: New York, 1992) p. 223. 
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Another reason in support of cooperation in arms production is that this 
mechanism can assist a producer in entering new markets. For example, US firms 
have proposed collaborative programs under the NATO umbrella, to enter 
“Fortress Europe market”. In addition, when one country produces a small 
number of weapons, “large economies should be achieved by combining 
production procurements of each participant [country].”17
 
 2.1.4. Cooperation in Arms Production 
 Various types of cooperation evolved as a result of new challenges in 
market. These types could be summarized as follows; licensed production and 
offset 
 
2.1.4.1. Licensed Production 
This type of cooperation occurred mainly in 1980s. It entails transnational 
sale or transfer of rights to manufacture a weapons system that was originally 
developed in the supplier country. Licensed production is also depicted as the 
“one-way flow” of technology. The reason is that supplier country benefits much 
more than importing state. At least, supplier state has an advantageous position by 
infiltrating to importing states’ defense market.  Transatlantic cooperation during 
the Cold War occurred mainly in this fashion. As opposed to this one-way 
approach, European countries proposed a “two-way street” approach in which the 
United States would open its markets to European defense industrial goods.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Jacques Gansler The Defense Industry. (MIT Press: US, 1982) p. 23. 
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2.1.4.2. Offsets 
European countries made attempts to overcome the deficiencies of the one-
way street approach by new types of cooperation. One of the most important types 
is the use of offsets. In fact, “offset” is not a new term. This concept was first used 
during the 1930s, in Germany and is “used to describe a range of commercial 
practices usually required as a condition of purchase, through which some portion 
of the purchase value is offset by the supplier in the purchasing country.”18 
Defense companies execute this concept in order to compensate the costs of 
exporting. Besides, offsets are not always in terms of money, some offset earnings 
could also include technological advances and so on. In the American Economic 
Alert websites, the term of offsets was defined as; 
Compensation (in essence a kick back) demanded by a buyer in 
one country for making a purchase from a company in another 
country. For example, if Turkey buys an airplane from Boeing, it 
may require that Boeing build part of the plane in Turkey; transfer 
technology to Turkish firms; and arrange for the purchase of other 
Turkish products or for investment in Turkish firms. As a result, 
offsets drain jobs, technology, and capital from the original 
manufacturing country. Companies victimized by offsets 
acknowledge the problem, but insist that these practices have 
become the unavoidable price that must be paid to export many 
kinds of products. U.S. military allies are among the heaviest 
users of offsets, and U.S. defense firms and workers are among 
the biggest targets.19
 
Offset has two sub-categories, one being direct offset, and the other indirect 
one.  
Direct offset, which includes co-production, is reciprocal business activity. 
It is specific to a product or service. Co-production, which involves a 
government-government agreement, generally has been generally employed when 
                                                 
18 Robert H. Trice. “Transnational Industrial Cooperation in Defense Programs” in ed. by. Ethan 
Kapstein Global Arms Production. p. 160. 
19 William R. Haskins. “Defense Offsets: Why Play Fair with ‘Allies` Who don’t”, American 
Economic Alert, 20 May 2005,also available on line at: 
http://www.americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=1941   
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states have the financial means but not the technological know-how to produce 
weapons. 
 
… [W]hen states possess financial resources to invest in an industrial 
infrastructure but lack technological know-how, they will be limited to 
assembling foreign weapons under licensing or co-production agreements; 
the F-16 program in Western Europe and Turkey provides a notable 
example.20                                                                                                                                                            
 
Indirect offset, on the other hand, comprises business activities on the part 
of manufacturer that benefit the purchaser but not directly in relation to the 
product or services sold. Co-development is one type of indirect offset. Co-
development “represents a leap over traditional methods of transnational 
industrial cooperation and increases the complexity as well as the financial and 
technical risks of new weapon programs”21 It involves two or more states sharing 
the costs of weapons project from basic R&D to final production. Besides, the 
diffusion of technology needed to share capital requirements in return for R&D 
and production work share increased the attractiveness of co-development. The 
most important projects in this category are the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) 
and Flight Simulator X (FSX) programs. The term of offset will be analyzed in 
detail at the end of this chapter. 
 However, cooperation in arms production is not easily accomplished. The 
most important reason has been the emphasis on the national sovereignty. When 
cooperation is in the area of defense, the emphasis placed on national sovereignty 
is much more than in other areas.  Moreover, the classical notion regarding 
efficiency in liberal theory has changed as a result of the imperfection of liberal 
                                                 
20 Ethan B. Kapstein. “International Collaboration in Arms Production: A Second-Best Solution” 
Political Science Quarterly. Vol 106:4 (1991-1992). p.665   
21 Robert Trice, ibid. p.163 
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ideology in the defense industry. The efficiency will be determined “[by] the 
length of domestic production runs and subsidized R&D spending.”22
 
 2.2.  Evolution of Defense Industries 
The defense industry emerged during the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries. 
In the same period, Europe witnesed the introduction of new military battlefield 
tactics and standing armies. The first tier23 state in this period was the United 
Kingdom. England had not only a state-owned defense industry, but also private 
industries, such as Vickers. The government supported such private firms that 
contributed to the process of technological innovation.  
Following the Industrial Revolution, second tier countries, such as Russia 
and Spain also came onto the scene. These countries were not able to innovate the 
necessary technology, but they could adopt it according to their needs in order to 
produce their own weapons. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
importance of military technology increased. United Kingdom held onto its 
position as a first tier state. Pre-second tier countries, such as Germany and 
France, also became first-tier states due to the speed of their industrialization. 
 
2.2.1. Pre-World War I Era 
An important modification in the international defense sector during the 
nineteenth century was the new reliance on arms exports for states. With the 
formation of German Krupp firm, free trade between German and British firms 
                                                 
22 Andrew Moravcsik, “The European Armaments Industry At the Crossroads” International 
Organization. Vol 40:4 (1992). p.72.  
23 In the defense literature, the states in the first tier, were those which could innovate required 
technology and produce  weapons, the second tier, which could reproduce and adopt technology 
but could not innovate, the third tier, which could only adopt technology and become dependent to 
the other state. 
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began.  As a result of the growth of export-oriented defense firms in Europe, arms 
production entered into a period of privatization. As Kapstein noted “[a]t the same 
time these defense industries looked to foreign markets in order to extend 
production runs and to achieve economies of scale. The late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were the heyday of free trade in armaments”24 Another feature 
of this period was that cooperation between states in the arms industry was 
initiated. Moreover, mergers and co-option between defense firms had also been 
another trend in the arms industry.   
By World War I, modern technologies concerning armament had diffused 
around the globe. The international scene was described by Krause as follows: 
 
[A] dominant tier of sellers who, by virtue of their mastery of techniques 
were the pre-eminent powers;a second tier of states(Russia, Italy, Austria-
Hungary and Spain) that, cognisant of the risks of dependence on foreign 
suppliers and of the benefits of possession of an arms industry, attempted to 
emualate first tier producers’ success; and a growing number of third tier 
states(most prominent among them China, Japan and Turkey) that possessed 
limited capacity to produce arms diffused from first tier states.25
 
However, arms transfer after the WWI, was faced some restrictions. After 
the demise of Germany and the horrific experience of the war, European powers 
questioned the desirability of arms transfer. “League of Nations launched an 
investigation into the role of arms trafficking before and during the war, and 
found that war manufacturers had fanned the flames of conflict.”26 For the first 
time in international defense history, public outcry was also involved in the 
decisions regarding arms transfers in Europe. In the US Congress and British 
Parliament, representatives criticized arms transfer. Moreover, the speech of 
                                                 
24 Ethan B.Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security, p.24 
25 Keith Krause, Arms and The State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge 
University Press: New York, 1992), p.32 
26 Frederic S. Pearson, The Global Spread of Arms: The Political Economy of National Security 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) p.45 
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British the then Prime Minister David Lloyd George affected the Convention of 
League of Nations. In his speech, he emphasized the relationship between private 
firms and the war, and stated that  
 
[T]here was a feeling that Krupp’s in Germany had a very pernicious influence 
upon the war spirit in Germany. There was not one who did not agree that if you 
wanted to preserve peace in the world you must eliminate the idea of proft in the 
manufacture of armaments.27  
 
As a result of this, policy makers in the first-tier countries scrutinized 
exports and increased control over arms exports. Yet despite these restrictions,  
second-tier countries also started to emerge on the international scene. These 
countries had successfully industralized and entered  the arms export market in 
order to spread the cost of R&D. The role of first-tier states’ role in the 
international defense area shrank as a result of newcomers.    
Another development after the war was the state’s presence in military 
R&D. After World War I, and despite the tendency of scientists to remain in 
civilian business, nations’ armed forces provided mechanisms for the 
intensification of scientific research in  military science. As Kapstein noted,   
 
[W]WI had profound effects on every part of American science and European also. 
Not only the out-moded equipment modifications, but also states had sponsored the 
innovation of high-tech weapons, such as electronic communications, anti-
submarine warfare detection, navigational improvements, aircraft carrier and the 
development of radar.28  
 
Moreover, governments, such as that of the  United States,  established 
bureaus for the control of technological innovations. This sensitivity also 
promoted the idea that R&D would not be left to the market and states would 
                                                 
27 Cited in Ibid. p.  34 
28 Ethan B. Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security.p.67 
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continue to regulate these activities. This militarization of science  also spread 
around the globe because scientists were employed in research efforts that were 
supported by foreign governments, as in the case of atomic science. There was 
mobility in the scientific community; scientists could work outside of their 
homeland. Another reason may have been that states were more aware of the 
other’s improvement in military technology. As a result of these developments, 
the globalization of technology in the defense sector started during the inter-war 
period.  
 
2.2.2. The Rise of Germany and World War II 
Apart from the limitation of arms transfer and newcomers to arms export 
market, there were other processes concerning defense industries. For example, 
the prolongation of the war situation, devastated the notion of trench warfare, 
because trench warfare had made industrial mobilization inevitable, and as a 
result, national resources and defense spending had doubled or trippled in four 
years time.  The rise of Germany during the post-World War I period can be 
better comprehended by looking at German mobilization right after the Versailles 
Treaty. Allied Powers forbid German militarization efforts However, German 
goverment did not abandon its efforts. Apart from this, being a  private defense 
firm, Krupp could also play an important role in the country’s militarization. For 
example, secret research, development and production were conducted under the 
supervision of Krupp. The Weimar government also supported these activities by 
directing the flow of funds to the firm. In addition, the growing Soviet arms 
industry employed the Krupp firm’s engineers and directors (under the Rapallo 
Treaty) “[...]in return for which facilities for training future Luftwaffe pilots and 
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testing artillery were provided.”29  The German government did not manufacture 
weapons in its own territory; rather, weapons were manufactured in other 
countries, such as the Netherlands and Sweden. “[German] canon were built by 
the German-owned Swedish firm Bofors, and in Holland, German-owned firms 
researched, designed and constructed U-boats for Japan, Finland, Spain, Turkey 
and Holland itself.”30 The result of this research and experience were transferred 
directly to Germany which started secretly producing tanks in 1928. 
In  World War II, new military technologies played an important part. 
During the war the development of radar, computers, the jet engine, and most 
dramatically, atomic power31 were developed. Moreover, strategic bombarding by 
air powers and defense by the air forces entered in the military technology during 
the World War II.  
[...] Two innovations, both largely products of World War II, dominated the 
second half of the century but proceeded with little interaction. One was the 
elaboration of nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems. The other was the 
radical reconstruction of onventional warfares through applied 
electronics[...]32
 
 The bureaucratic organizations that were created during the inter-war 
period for the purpose of scientific research, also had an important role in the war. 
For example, in Washington D.C., the Office of Scientific Research had direct 
access to President Roosevelt’s office. “Using the best human and capital 
resources that could be found in universities, industries and government, [this 
office] focused the research effort on technologies that appeared to be of 
                                                 
29 Keith Krause, Arms and The State. p. 77 
30 Frederic Pearson. The Global Spread of Arms. p. 67. 
31 In the history of warfare, nuclear weapons have been used only twice at the end of World War 
II. The first one, “Little Boy” was dropped on 6 August 1945, by the United States on the Japanese 
city of Hiroshima. The second one, “Fat Man” dropped on the city of Nagasaki by the United 
States. 
32 Barton C. Hacker. “ The Machines of War: Western Military Technology 1850-2000” History 
and Technology, Vol.21:3, 2005, pp.255-300 
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particular military importance.”33 Moreover, the atomic bomb dropped in 
Nagasaki, Japan in 1943 was invented firstly in Los Amalos. To use it effectively 
in war, scientists worked only 28 months. This pace  could  be an indication that  
“The USA in 1940 and 1941 learned how to harness research to military needs 
effectively.”34 State intervention for the purpose of R&D  again became one of 
the legacies in the defense sector.  
A significant consequence of World War II was the emergence of the Soviet 
Union and the United States as the superpowers.  The rise of the Soviet Union as 
a superpower underlined the significance of indigenous defense industries. The 
Soviet Union  used arms transfer as a way of political power as in the case of its 
exports to Turkey. As a result of such exports, political influence by means of 
arms transfers entered onto the international scene. Not only the Soviet policy, but 
also that of the United States was based on using arms transfers and  military aid 
in order to extend its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union and the United States 
being the winning party in WWII became the major players in the Cold War 
system. However, in the defense sector, in addition to first-tier countries, new 
third-tier states emerged in the 1960s. 
After the WWII, European industrial bases were devastated except in 
Britain. However, Germany and France were successful in recovering their 
losses, with the assistance of the United States. In the next section, I will focus 
on the major players; their defense industries and arms export policies. Then, I 
will examine Europe’s recovery period and the European Union.  Finally, I will 
analyze third-tier states, namely Brazil. 
 
                                                 
33 Ethan B. Kapstein. The Political Economy of National Security. p. 26 
34 Barton C. Hacker  “ The Machines of War” History and Technology, p.256 
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2.2.3. Cold War 
 
 
2.2.3.1. Superpower’s Defense Industries   
As stated earlier, the Soviet Union and the United States tried to attract 
the allegiance of other states through military aid and arms transfers. Moreover, 
these aids by the major powers were in the form of “off-the-shelf”35 equipment. 
This equipment was not, however, manufactured according to the latest 
technology that both powers had at that time.  
 
 
2.2.3.1.1. US’ Export Policies 
The United States utilized foreign military aid and sales to increase its 
influence on the recipients.  Initially, the United States directed many of its 
transfers to the devastated European market, in order to help them for economic 
recovery. One of the assistance programs was called the Military Assistance 
Program (MAP). This grant program was directed to NATO members and Asian 
allies. Its major recipients were: France ($24,029,000), South Korea ($ 
15,337,000), Turkey ($ 14,841,000) Italy ($ 12,710,000) and Greece ($ 
7,492,000). The second program, Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF), was 
a grant program for Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Korea and the Philippines. Last but 
not least, US exported its arms through Foreign Military Sales. Most sales were 
conducted through this program, but recipients of such aid could vary when US 
foreign policy changed.  The United States at times used military aid for political 
purposes by reducing it or cutting it off. For example, the United States initiated 
                                                 
35 Commercial off-the-shelf is a term for software or hardware products that are ready-made and 
available for sale to the general public. They are often used as alternatives to in-house 
developments or one-off government-funded developments (GOTS). The use of COTS is being 
mandated across many government and business programs, as they may offer significant savings 
in procurement and maintenance. 
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arms transfers to Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. This 
induced the recipients to develop their indigenous industries.   
Thus it could be concluded that US political decisions were the main 
bases for the implementation of exports. Besides, these policies enabled US 
governments to justify increasing defense budgets and R&D projects. However, 
sometimes the executive and legislative powers had different viewpoints 
regarding arms transfers.  It should also be noted that US arms transfers were 
regulated and overseen by governmental agencies such as Arms Export Control 
Board.  
 
2.2.3.1.2. Arms Export Policies of the Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union used the same kind of policy moves as the United 
States in order to expand its sphere of influence. However, its arms transfer 
reports were secret during that period and the reports that were open to the public 
were exaggerated.36 Another point about Soviet arms transfer is that until 1955, 
recipients (Eastern Europe, North Korea, China and North Vietnam) generally 
imported World War II era equipment and did not receive large quantities of 
arms, because according to the Soviet Union, their reliability were not tested. 
However, as the United States shifted its interests from Europe to other countries, 
the Soviet Union signed a major pact with a non-European and non-communist 
state, Egypt. Middle East thus became a destination for global arms transfers. 
The Soviet Union extended its agreement with Egypt to Syria, Yemen, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Indonesia. This may also have been a reflection of Soviet 
foreign policy considerations in the area of arms transfer.  
                                                 
36 Keith Krause, Arms and The State, p.89 
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Soviet aids to these countries were on the basis of credit, and the 
repayment of this debt would be in local currency or barter agreements. Yet, 
despite these advantages in relation to arms transfers (large quantities of weapons 
that were also less costly than those offered by the United States), the Soviet 
Union was reluctant to transfer high-tech weapons to other countries. The growth 
in Soviet arms transfer occurred in 1960s. The reason for this increased in 
volume could be related to international events. The Sino-Soviet split led the 
Soviet Union to encourage revolutions and independence movements in Africa 
and Asia. Soviet Union supported countries such as Somalia, Guinea, and South 
Yemen by new arms transfer agreements. In addition to their rivalry with China, 
“[t]he Soviets needed to increase facilities available to their navy to accompany 
its expanded global role; thus deals for access to such facilities were negotiated 
with clients such as Egypt, Vietnam and Syria.”37  These transfers to developing 
countries continued in 1970s and 1980s. Until the Iran-Iraq war, Soviet policy 
makers perceived restrictions on arms transfers as a policy of imperialist states. 
However, the war changed their viewpoint, and the Soviet Union started to act in 
conjunction with its rivals for the purpose of controlling the export of 
technologies for military purposes to developing countries.  
 
2.2.3.1.3. The American  Defense Market  
Arms exports have thus been conceptualized as an important method of 
influence in international politics, especially when the major powers performed 
such exports. This section will focus on the domestic side of the defense 
industries in these countries. First, US defense companies were numerous in the 
                                                 
37 Ibid. p.90 
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market. This concentration meant that one area of the arms system was 
developed by only one firm. For example, the aircraft producer was Newport 
News; two firms produced jet aircraft engines (General Dynamics and Newport 
News). This structure sustained the division of labor in the arms industry in the 
United States. Naturally, the only buyer in the defense sector was the Department 
of Defense (DoD).                                    
The determination of military specifications for all hardware are 
determined by the DOD so that in economic terms, US defense industry has been 
“monopsony”38. Defense firms have generally proposed their plans on a long 
term basis. The US government extends funds to these firms on the basis of its 
annual budget. However, these funds could be decreased, delayed or increased.  
This uncertainty has led companies to use sophistication in their defense planning 
and defense firms in the United States focused much more on R&D than their 
past practices. They have invested large sums of money without any guarantees 
from the government. It was also realized that when weapons were manufactured 
in terms of high-tech, the possibility of sale to the government would increase. 
Moreover, these firms were not able to operate freely. They were strictly 
overseen, not only by  
 
[T]heir managers at the Department of Defense, but by various congressional 
bodies as well including congressional committees, the General Accounting 
Office, and the Congressional Budget Office. Since defense contracts are 
high-stake business, members of Congress are active in ensuring that a piece 
of pie goes to their local constituents. This means that economically optimal 
decisions are often set-aside for politically expedient ones.39  
 
                                                 
38 In economics, a monopsony is a market form with only one buyer, called "monopsonist", facing 
many sellers. A monopsonist has market power, due to the fact that he/she can affect the market 
price of the purchased good by varying the quantity bought. 
39 Cited in Ethan Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security. p. 45. 
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Another issue about the defense industry in the United States is that 
defense firms have been active during the decision-making process, by the way 
of lobbying. Such firms have been able to attract Congress representatives by 
promising new employment opportunities for their district and so on. Lobbying 
led to questions of “privatized wars” and “privatized destructions,” although, 
these assumptions did not go beyond being a conspiracy theory. For example, 
Gholz and Sapolzsky analyzed US defense industry by a theory called “follow-on 
theory” which had to do with the power of lobbying.  They argued that “[i]n 
contrast to innovative high- technology sectors, the defense business was stable 
because the Military Industrial Complexes(MIC) created new jobs for prime 
contractors as they completed old projects.”40 Moreover, it was stated that 
pleasing the customer, i.e. the military, was more important than pleasing 
Congress, so that despite technological uncertainties, firms focused on 
performance enhancement.41
 
2.2.3.1.4. Soviet  Defense Market  
For its part, the Soviet defense industry was highly bureaucratized. For 
example, for each phase of weapons production, several ministries were set up.  
Moreover, a number of bureaus and specialized industries oversaw and carried 
out the R&D process in the Soviet Union. As Pearson mentioned, 
 
[A]ccording to the US intelligence community, the VPK42 is a small but 
powerful group, responsible for centrally overseeing the research, 
development and production of all Soviet weapon systems. It coordinates 
developments between its chief customer, the Ministry of Defense, and the 
key suppliers, the defense industrial ministries. As the expediter of weapons-
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development projects, it is the principal Soviet military instrument for 
eliminating or circumventing the inefficiencies characteristic of Soviet 
economic system.43  
 
The Soviet economy was developed on the basis of five-year plans. There 
was stability in the weapons procurement systems, which was unheard of in the 
Western countries. Stable budgets and constant manpower level would result in a 
regular progression of designs and prototypes, “… and would also allow the 
Soviet research and design bureaus to maintain and develop a corps of experts (in 
contrast with the shifting manpower with the cycles in the US defense 
industry)”.44 This stability and certainty in economic terms was the underlying 
reason for the strong military complex in the Soviet Union. Another difference 
from the situation in the United States was that concentration in the defense 
sector was not the model adopted in the Soviet Union. Government opted to 
separate the weapons manufacturing process to different centers. Senior military 
officers directed these firms.   
 
2.2.3.2. Western European Defense Industry 
European45 countries after the World War II lost most of their industrial 
base. Although the British industrial structure suffered less than that of 
continental Europe. Western European countries revived their industrial structure 
with the help of aid from the United States, as mentioned earlier. They were able 
to use these grants either to revive their indigenous arms industries, or to co-
produce sophisticated arms with the United States. As Gansler pointed out 
“[m]ost producers opted for sophisticated local production, relying on other 
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suppliers for licenses to produce key components such as jet engines or advanced 
electronics.”46
  These countries emerged as second-tier states during the 1960s and 
1970s. Germany and France relied on first-tier countries, namely the United 
States, for technological equipment. However they were successful in exporting 
their arms to developing countries. The reason for the export-oriented policy in 
these countries, and also for the difference between the United States and 
European countries in this area, was that domestic demand for weapons in 
Europe was much lower than that in the United States. In order to benefit from 
exports, these countries searched for new markets. For example, France used its 
colonial past to its advantage, exporting much of its equipment to its former 
colonies. Before analyzing the export orientation of these countries, I will focus 
on their revival, especially the French arms industry. I will then elaborate on 
arms transfers, by these countries.  
Europeans, by means of collaborative projects with the Americans, 
benefited from technological advances by the Americans. Moreover, they were 
successful at acquiring these technologies according to their need. By the 1970s, 
European countries represented a serious challenge to the United States.  Not 
only the technological base, but also US aids and grants promoted the 
development of military infrastructure in states like France and Italy.  
 
[T]his American aid also made it possible to reduce the burden of defense on 
European economies and, in a sense, also constituted the second stage in the 
standardization of equipment within NATO after the equipping of European 
armies…47
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However, when the US aid began to decrease, European countries started to 
look at cooperative measures among themselves such as mergers or collaborative 
projects. In 1950, the first attempt about promoting cooperation in Europe came 
from France. It proposed the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC).  
Despite being the initiator of the project, opposition to the draft proposal came 
mainly from France. In France, cooperation with Germany under the auspices of 
Anglo-Saxons and the loss of sovereignty in defense issues would not be 
welcome by the public. After this unsuccessful trial, European countries 
launched another project called the Western European Union (WEU), established 
on 23 October 1954.  The French government made another proposal calling for 
a European Armament Agency to exist within the WEU. This agency would be a 
supranational authority, which would organize standardization of equipment and 
cooperation in Europe, and which would be responsible for harmonizing 
requirements and for sharing production between countries. Although, other 
European countries did not support this proposal, they did establish a 
consultative body within the WEU, called Standing Armaments Committee, 
which was responsible for promoting standardization and cooperation.  
During this period of limited cooperation, the United States offered a new 
financial assistance to the European countries so that they could produce 
American equipment under license. As de Vestel emphasized 
 
[US] aid than took the form of the transfer of technology and financial 
assistance to enable a number of projects to be launched, the most important of 
which were the F-104 (produced jointly by Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Italy), Hawk missiles (five European countries), Sidewinder air to air 
missile (eight) and Bullpup firearm (four).48
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. p. 27 
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 However, these efforts did not sustain the harmonization of equipment 
between the various nations and thus interoperability between countries was not 
as successful as desired. In 1965, the United States again made an attempt to 
harmonize and rationalize overall armaments in the market by the way of setting 
up a Defense Common Market within NATO. Through this, countries would 
specialize in certain areas of production where they had a comparative 
advantage. However, due to their desires to control their own national defense 
industries, the European countries also refused this proposal.  
Aside from these American efforts, European countries managed to 
cooperate in arms production during the late 1960s. One collaborative project 
was the maritime patrol aircraft Breguet Atlantique in which France, Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands cooperated in the area of R&D. Other projects 
included AS-30 missile (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), Franco-
German projects such as Milan and Roland missiles, Franco-British projects such 
as the Jaguar aircraft, the Puma tank, Lynx, an anti-surface search and attack 
maritime helicopter and the Gazelle, a light utility helicopter. The most important 
collaborative project, the Tornado aircraft, was co-produced by Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Italy. This project has applications in both the military and 
civil aerospace industries. It was also important in the sense that “[Tornado 
aircraft project] was an expression of the partners’ ambition: to develop an 
aircraft that would stand up comparison with the best American aircraft.”49 
Moreover, it also started a competition between the United States and Europe and 
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the 1970s was thus not only the decade of the revival of European national 
defense industries, but also of their competition with the United States.  
Whatever their national interests were, these countries pursued a policy of 
cooperation in Europe. The common idea behind this strategy was that through 
cooperation they would acquire the necessary know-how and expertise, and also 
reduce the cost of R&D.  
 
[The] reason for the unsatisfactory tradeoff between quality and quantity is 
the existence of “learning committees”, an industrial phenomenon whereby 
employees and mangers engaged in the production of highly complex system 
require considerable before they learn to work efficiently... The more 
complex the system, the more severe R&D and learning diseconomies are 
created by the short production run.50  
 
In Europe, the focus on the cost of production rather than on the 
performance of equipment was relatively greater than the United States. “The 
Europeans are much more constrained economically when it comes to weapons 
development”51 This idea was the underlying reason behind European reliance 
on cooperation in the continent. Another reason for collaborative projects was 
that national requirements could be met by the use of international means. The 
most sophisticated projects could be completed through collaborative programs. 
For example, the German aerospace industry, as a result of its cooperation with 
European countries such as Tornado as well as with the United States was able to 
acquire a high level of competence in the fields of integration, design and 
technology. In order to elaborate on the European defense industry and underline 
highly nationalistic policies, the next section focuses on French case. 
 
                                                 
50 Andrew Moravcisk, “The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads" Survival Vol.24: 4. 
(January-February 1990) p.65 
51 Ethan B. Kapstein, “International Collaboration” p.34 
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2.2.3.2.1. French Defense Industry   
 French governments have worked to establish national defense industry 
since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
 i. Motives to Establish  a National Defense Industry 
 The main reason for these attempts had to do with military influence which 
crossed over into political life, especially when issues of national sovereignty 
were concerned. For example, France chose to use US grants to revive its local 
defense base, and it was also the first to coin the idea of national championship. 
As Kolodziej emphasized 
 
[French motives] arises from the demands of national populations 
everywhere, no less in France, for greater material welfare and for a more 
equitable share of national wealth and of the world’s resources. An 
independent, national capacity to design and develop arms and an open-door 
policy to sell them as well as military technology-ventes d’armes tous 
azimuts- has been a policy instrument of significance equal to the force de 
frappe. 52
 
Another reason for having a strong defense industry base was the French 
desire to project autonomous national power to shape the international 
environment according to its needs. It might have been expected that during the 
Cold War, this policy would not work. However, for French policy makers, such 
a goal was not impossible. “[The] French state guided by the regimes of the 
Fourth and Fifth Republics, has pursued strategic policies calculated to maximize 
French influence and independence. This was notably true of the Gaullist Fifth 
Republic.”53                                   
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The revival of French firms, during the Cold War was possible thanks to 
US grants or aids. For example, the French-made Mystere IV was purchased by 
the United States. The experience by the Mystere project led the French 
aerospace sector to be successful in other aircraft projects in Europe. However, 
the French desire to have a national and independent arms production base 
hastened the process of its defense industry under the guidance of the 
government.  
ii. French Governmental Structure Responsible for Defense Industry  
 French government set up Délégation Générale pour l’Armement (DGA), 
which was responsible for military R&D and production.  
 
First [DGA] is the principal administrative mechanism through which the 
military services purchase arms. Second it is also a major producer of arms 
through centuries-old French arsenal system. Third, and largely operating 
through the Delegate for International Relation54 (DIR), the DGA assumes 
central direction for France’s global arms effort.55
 
 The French arms procurement mechanism was the tightest among the 
European countries. This agency was “… structured by tightly interwoven 
industrial and financial links, as well as by personal relationship between 
government and industry”56
 In addition, the DGA was composed of engineers and technocrats, who 
shared a similar educational background. As a result of this, arms procurement 
decisions would be separate from party politics and bureaucracy, because these 
technocrats had common ideas regarding the independence and national status of 
France. This commonality was understandable, given that the DGA had the right 
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to supervise engineer schools that were under the supervision of Ministry of 
Defense.  
Despite the French emphasis on national independence, France also took 
advantage of the opportunity to collaborate with European countries, as 
mentioned earlier. The underlying reason was economic considerations such as 
larger production runs to decrease the unit costs, sharing the costs of R&D, 
access to foreign technology and know-how and so on. However, in the French 
case, there was also a political motive, i.e. the desire to be the leader of European 
integration process in the defense sector. Moreover, French colonies became a 
“strategic burden” rather than “assets”, thus France started to look to continental 
Europe for its strategic future.  
 
iii. French Policies on Arms Export  
 France was also quite successful in exporting arms. For French defense 
industry, Third World countries became a major source of demand. As 
Brozska&Lock mentioned “[i]n the 1960s and 1970s arms transactions became 
more commercial as the oil revenues of the OPEC provided an alternative source 
to finance purchases.”57 Moreover, the transfer of arms was notable not only in 
quantity but also in quality. France started to export modern weapon systems to 
Third World countries. This was due to the aggressive French commercial 
policies. As Kolodziej exemplified  
 
[F]rance was the last Western supplier to abandon its lucrative arms trade with 
South Africa, and then only after sustained pressures from Black African states and 
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the UN. French sales of military aircraft, missiles, armored ground vehicles, and 
naval craft were justified as contributions to South African external security.58
 
 
 Meanwhile, the economic imperatives of the defense industry overrode 
foreign policies and strategic objectives of the French government. However, in 
political terms, aggressive commercial policy, or open-door policy, “… provided 
France with an instrument to influence the policies of purchasing governments 
and to assist friends and allies.”59 The export issue was also kept secret by the 
government and the bureaucracy. “[Arms export policy] is a model of closed 
bureaucratic politics… in France there was the absence of broad public or inter-
party debate or even serious disagreement between the major political groupings 
over France’s arms position.”60   
To sum up, the European defense industries were revived by the American 
aids and grants. The European states were successful at adapting grants 
according to their needs. Collaborative projects in Europe reduced the costs of 
arms production. In addition, they pursued aggressive commercial policy in order 
to decrease the unit costs. Thus, for European countries, quantity for arms trade 
was more important than quality of arms. 
 
2.2.3.3. The Defense Industry of Developing Countries  
According to arms trade categorization, developing countries are labeled as 
third-tier state. These countries are able to produce only one or two sophisticated 
weapon system. “They [also] remain dependent upon imports of critical 
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sophisticated subsystems and little or no transfer of knowledge required going 
beyond the simple reproduction or copying of weapons occur.”61  The third-tier 
states, despite their scarce resources, typically devote most of their GNP to the 
arms manufacturing or arms transfer.  
As mentioned in the Gansler’s book “the developed world, to which all 
major arms suppliers belong, spends about 5 per cent of its GNP on military 
forces, while the developing world for the most part highly deficient in 
armaments production, devotes more to defense.”62 However, in some cases, this 
devotion of resources was not made in vain. Countries such as Brazil, Israel, 
India and Argentina managed to develop their own national industries. In the 
sections that follow, I will focus on motives for acquiring defense industry, and 
then I will briefly examine Brazil’s achievement on this field. 
 
2.2.3.3.1. Motives to Establish National Defense Industry  
The first motive was that these countries faced threats to their survival, to 
their political independence or to their territorial integrity. This can be best 
understood by looking at the Israeli case. It is known that Israel perceived itself 
as an island embedded in an “Arab sea”. The only means to survive in this sea 
was armament. Over time the militarization of its industry has enabled Israel to 
produce the most sophisticated weapons in the arms market.     
The second motive was that these countries perceived autonomy in military 
hardware as a potential asset. For example, policy makers in Argentina believed 
that their defeat in the Falkland War was the result of their deficiency in 
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domestic arms production. Its larger neighbor was in a similar situation: “… 
Brazil’s basic goal [wa]s also self-sufficiency, to be achieved constantly 
increasing the local content of military goods with a possible spin-off for 
exports.”63  
The third motive, which is related to the second one, is that such countries 
did not want to rely totally on the United States or other Western powers for 
arms, because of their experiences. For example, Israel faced arms embargo 
during its creation, in 1947. Moreover in 1967, during Arab-Israeli War, France 
put an embargo on arms transfers to Israel. Moreover, as Dvir&Tishler noted 
“[w]hen the British interrupted the provision of spare parts for Centurian tanks, 
during the Yom Kippur War in 1973; Israel built its own main battle tank, the 
Merkava.”64 As a result of these embargoes, Israel produced as much of its own 
arms as it possibly could. Another type of embargo that was applied to various 
nations in recent decades, was linking arms exports to the countries’ human 
rights record. For example, during the Carter administration, the United States 
imposed a number of embargoes on Third World countries. Such embargoes 
increased the desire to have an indigenous defense industry such that countries 
like Brazil and Argentina speeded up their military industrialization process.  
The fourth factor was that, like civilian manufactures defense industry was 
a way to create job opportunities, to acquire technological know-how, and to 
reduce foreign exchange costs. Moreover, developing countries perceived 
defense industry as a tool that could contribute to economic growth.  
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The fifth factor was that some countries perceived exporting arms as a way 
to enhance their influence both within region and beyond. For example, 
“[A]rgentina has exhibited a national security interest in Bolivia. In pursuing its 
aims, Argentina has supplied La Paz with substantial amounts of military 
equipment, including howitzers and thousands of rounds of ammunition.”65 
However, these exports were generally unsophisticated or uncomplicated 
weapons such as small arms, light fighters or ammunition. The importers were 
generally less wealthy states or states that had difficulty in acquiring arms from 
first or second-tier states. As a result, third-tier states became “first-tier” in the 
eyes of small countries. 
On the basis of these factors, some developing countries managed to 
acquire indigenous defense industries. One of them was Brazil. In order to 
broaden the analysis, I will focus on the development of Brazilian defense 
industry in the next section. 
 
2.2.3.3.2. Brazilian Defense Industry 
Despite its status as a developing country, Brazil succeeded in producing 
sophisticated weaponry. Before the 1960s, Brazil imported much of its weaponry 
from the United States and lacked the necessary infrastructure to adapt 
technologies according to its needs. In the late 60s, Brazil started to look to 
different suppliers for its arms equipment. As a result of President Carter’s 
emphasis on human right records, Brazil turned to Western Europe. Cooperation 
with European countries, rather than the United States, “[…] included the gradual 
transfer of production technology, from direct supply of the first units to local 
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assembly and ultimately indigenous manufacture.”66 By the 1970s, Brazil acquired 
technological infrastructure for simple weapons, light aircraft, artillery and 
armored cars. Till 1980s, it was able to export overseas, with its sales centered in 
Middle East. 
i. Brazil’s Motives   
The Brazilian motives for acquiring national defense industry could be 
understood in terms of politics and economics. As political motives, 
independence in developing an arms industry was the most important one. 
According to Brazilian officers, the state needs to be able to produce its own 
arms. As Sanders noted in his book, “[t]he Brazilian military arrived at a 
consensus with the leaders of industry and agriculture toward the goal of working 
for Brazilian “greatness” an idea that has become a Brazilian psyche.”67  Brazil 
had other motives, which also had to do with the “greatness” of the country. 
Having a strategic defense industry would enhance its influence in the South 
American continent and also in other parts of world such as Africa and Asia. 
Moreover, arms exports would give Brazil economic and political clout vis-à-vis 
its customers and prevent other rival countries from playing the same role.   
Another factor, which had more to do with domestic politics, was the fact 
that Brazil was under military rule from 1964 to 1985.  The military, which 
guided the Brazilian policy making process, played a key role in making the 
development of a Brazilian national defense industry possible. In addition, Brazil 
realized its economic miracle, putting itself in an advantageous position for 
developing its infrastructure. The defense industry would provide military 
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backing in politics whenever it wanted. “[T]he development of a defense industry 
created an opening or raison d’etre for the Brazilian Armed Forces to assume an 
active role in the country’s domestic and foreign political and economic 
spheres.”68  
In addition to political motives, economic factors also affected Brazil’s 
desire to develop its own defense industry. The first one was the import-
substitution industrialization strategy (ISI)69, which was one of the economic 
policies implemented in Brazil. This policy helped Brazilian government to deal 
with the bottlenecks that existed in sectors essential for defense industry. 
Moreover, the ISI strategy made possible the rise and the development of a 
computer industry and microelectronics technology.  The success of this strategy 
also owed to the Brazilian government. Because it implemented the ISI, by 
facilitating strong linkages with importers, sectors that import goods, and 
exporters. Another factor was the Brazilian government’s increasing emphasis on 
developing indigenous technologies. However, this was not envisioned as a 
trade-off between guns and butter, but rather in the sense that the industry would 
develop “dual-use technologies” that would be usable in both civilian and 
military products. As Neto pointed out “[B]razilian policy makers, however, 
justified the defense industry by noting changes in merging national security 
ideals, geopolitical goals, economic growth, and technological innovation.”70
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ii. Strategies Pursued for a Brazilian Defense Industry  
What were the strategies that were followed by the Brazilian government to 
acquire national arms production base? Primarily, military advisers re-equipped 
the army and met other military needs by focusing on economic growth that was 
taking place in the automotive and steel industries. The military industry was 
supported by this civilian industrial technology, and in return, government funds 
and the military’s orders for jeep, trucks and tents strengthened civilian industry. 
Moreover, during the initiation phase, government also set up new military 
research institutes including the Aerospace Technology Center, the Institute of 
Military Engineering and the Naval Research Center. After this structuring 
period, Brazil started to produce first civilian goods, such as civil airplanes. 
During the second stage arms production process there were plans to devote 
greater resources to the arms industry and military research.  As emphasized by 
Brigagao 
 
[T]he allocation of funds to research became larger and more frequent over time, 
and included extraordinary credits approved during each fiscal year. The military 
also used the power of secret decree government directives not made public-to 
further increase its share of federal budget.71
 
 Joint ventures were another area of mobilization in the Brazilian industry. 
These were conducted with the approval of military élite and more than a 
hundred were implemented. 
As the industry grew larger, the Brazilian decision makers set up Brazilian 
War Material Company (IMBEL) in 1974. This organization was mostly 
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comprised of military personnel so that it was under the control of military. 
IMBEL  
 
[H]elped to increase investment in and the commercialization of imports and 
exports needed for defense industry development. The military expected that 
this would strengthen Brazil’s industrial sector so that it could become more 
efficient regarding both internal and external security.72  
 
IMBEL consisted of both state-owned and small private factories. Its policy 
regarding exports was to bring capital, technology and international customers to 
the domestic market.  Moreover, it had the right to acquire patents and software 
equipment and revise import substitution policies. 
The defense industry in Brazil was largely state-owned. For instance, the 
most successful industrial enterprise, the aircraft producer EMBREA, was owned 
by the state. Its success was because of joint ventures and licensing agreements. 
“[This factory] enabled the aircraft producer to acquire large-scale assembling 
technology from the Italian firm Aermacchi, sales techniques from the US 
company Piper, and inputs such as landing gear for its airplanes from the French 
company Eran.”73 This company has also been the major exporter to newly 
industrializing countries. Its success was a result partly of its flexibility in 
designing both civilian and military products. However, despite the dominant 
position of state-owned enterprises, the private firms such as Engesa, and 
Avibras played an important role in Brazilian defense industry. These firms 
specialized in certain sectors of military production. For example, Engesa 
specialized in the wheeled armored fighting vehicles, while Avibras worked in 
the areas of space research systems, satellite communications and the like.  
                                                 
72 Ethan Kapstein “The Brazilian Defense Industry” p.389 
73 Raul Neto “How Brazil Competes with Global Defense Industry” p.96  
 41
iii. Brazilian Arms Export Policies 
Arms exports were perceived by Brazilian policy makers as a way to 
project influence in its region. For example, “[d]iplomats serve as salesman, 
speaking with local defense ministries about procurement while promoting the 
benefits of Brazilian manufactures and Brazilian state.”74 Arms transfer from 
Brazil went primarily to developing countries. The uncertainties of imports from 
the United States led these states to turn to other suppliers, and Brazil then had 
the opportunity to serve in that role. Moreover, the Brazilian marketing strategy 
for exporting arms  
 
[Wa]s considered quite flexible, no-end user certificates are required, the decision left to 
the independent states’ decisions. Moreover, Brazilian producers achieved high degree of 
flexibility in hardware design in seeking to accommodate their customer’s needs as much 
as possible.75  
 
 Defense firms in Brazil also had the ability of “tropicalizing” their 
technology, meaning that the technology could be modified according to 
importer’s need.  
There were criticisms at Brazil’s role in the arms trade, which focused 
largely on Brazil’s non-discrimination policy- i.e., Brazil did not restrict its 
exports according to the local conflicts. Its export policy, which very much 
resembled that of France, was also considered an aggressive commercial policy. 
For example, Brazil continued to export arms to Honduras, a country in conflict 
with its neighbor. It also went on exporting arms to Iraq, during the Iran-Iraq 
war. According to an estimate by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), 40 percent of all Brazilian arms transfers from 1985 to 1989 
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went to Iraq.76  As a result of this, it was asked whether “Brazil [has] not only 
militarized its economy by seeking industrialization through the strength of its 
armaments, but [it] has also militarized its foreign relations”77.    
 
2.3. Globalization Process  
 
After the Cold War, most Western states reduced their defense spending. 
There was no immediate threat, so that there was no need to devote a significant 
portion of the budget to defense. However, defense firms did not welcome this 
process because their major customers were governments. Moreover, during the 
Soviet era, it was easy to determine who was a friend and who was a foe. As 
Keller noted “[However] in today’s environment, future guarantees of assured 
access to industry and technology are much less predictable due to great 
uncertainties associated with future Third World countries and regional 
conflict.”78  
 
2.3.1. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Technology during the 
Process of Globalization 
 Another factor that led to a “quiet revolution” in the defense industry is 
the upgrading of weapons. The Revolution in Military Affairs, especially in the 
United States, has resulted in the increasing prevalence of sophisticated weapons. 
The RMA is related to the emergence of both new threats, many of which 
couldn’t be met by conventional means, and a shift in the nature of core military 
technologies. While large and complex individual platforms would still have a 
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role, they would be less important than an overall complex of systems, both 
hardware and software centered, integrated into much larger networks of 
capabilities. “It further emphasizes the importance of technology acquisition, 
systems conceptualization and managerial integration possibilities rather than 
hardware development and manufacturing per se.”79 Moreover, the RMA implies  
[The] combination of joint force doctrines, strategies and tactics, changes in 
military organization and integrated logistical support with the development 
of intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), command, 
control, communication and computer-processing (C4) and precision force.80  
 
 In the wake of global terrorism, technology has also gained importance in 
new sectors, such as intelligence and surveillance system, anti-terrorist security 
device, small arms and stun grenades, some of which can be provided by small 
firms competitive markets (unlike airlift and smart weapons).81   
 Another aspect of technology in the global world is that commercial 
technology began to drive innovation to a greater extent than military R&D.  
There was competition between civilian and military industries so innovation in 
the market accelerated. Mussington emphasized that “[as] a consequence in 
selected industries commercial advances outpace those in defense applications. 
Technological dependencies that limit national access to sensitive products and 
processes have serious implications for national security.”82 States began to 
adopt critical technology policies as a response to the growing problem. 
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2.3.2. The Solution to Decrease Weapon Manufacture Cost: International 
Cooperation 
 The costs of these new developments along with decreasing budgets in the 
defense sector led defense firms to focus on other markets or to engage in 
collaborative and cooperative activities with foreign firms. Although 
globalization foresees the restriction of custom duties and trans-nationalization of 
activities, the defense industry would remain under the control of government. It 
is because: 
 
[D]efense spending is a public good, paid by national taxpayers and overseen 
by national legislators who would prefer to see public money t in domestic 
markets to employ their voters and to provide broader national benefits. In 
general, the desire to avoid dependence on foreigners for critical defense 
products and knowledge is still powerful. Furthermore, defense exports an 
extension of foreign policy and government will want to retain a say in the 
flow and direction of such goods and services…. Governments will want to 
ensure that the globalization of defense industrial production will not 
compromise national security and national economy.83
 
Without going into more detail on this globalization vs. government debate, 
this thesis will focus on emerging trends among international defense firms, 
which increased cooperation between firms. Where domestic demand decreases 
because of the disappearance of threats, firms need to adapt their functions 
according to the market. First of all, in European countries, rationalization 
process started. In this process, excess production diminished, and some of the 
production was terminated. In other words, plant closures and lay offs occurred 
in defense firms. For example, the British company BAe decided to close four of 
its factories and went for 4700 job cuts.  
 The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 1990 was also another 
catalyst for rationalization. It was concluded between NATO and the Warsaw 
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Pact countries. With the demise of the Soviet Union, European countries decided 
to limit their forces in Europe because of increasing budget constraints.  
 
2.3.2.1. Mergers  
Another trend was the merger of small companies with larger ones. In 
addition, a number of transnational mergers took place in the 1990s. When a 
merger takes place within the boundaries of a nation, this can also be considered 
as an example of consolidation. For example, in Germany, government supported 
the consolidation process. It tried to save one of its biggest companies, MBB, but 
was not successful and so turned to the private sector allowing Daimler Benz to 
take over MBB. However, the consolidation of bigger companies also creates 
apprehension about monopolization, which would decrease the competitiveness 
of market. 
 As for international mergers, British Aerospace, Daimler Chrysler, and the 
French Aerospatiale and Matra, were planning to merge in order to form the 
European Aerospace and Defense Company. There were also transatlantic 
mergers. For example, the American firm Raytheon merged with the French 
Thomson. A primary motivation behind the US firms’ desire to merge with 
European companies was the fact that “[…] everywhere, the pressure to buy 
domestic remain[ed] fierce. Access to foreign markets w[ould] be easier for 
American contracts if they c[ould] partner with companies based in buyer and 
competitor countries.”84  
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 2.3.2.2. Collaboration  
Another method of going global is collaboration, which is in some way a 
compromise between remaining national and going fully global. As mentioned in 
the Kapstein’s article 
 
[C]ollaborative arrangements for the production of complex weapon systems 
represent a second-best solution to the problem of defense acquisition. Such 
arrangements reflect the desire to maintain domestic military-industrial 
capacity on the one hand, while incorporating capital and technology on the 
other hand. In short collaboration represents a form of protectionism. As a 
policy instruments, collaboration seeks to resolve the underlying tension 
between nationalistic conceptions of security and the globalization of defense 
industries.85   
  
Collaborative projects are not a new phenomenon within the defense 
industry. However, in a global world, the pace of these projects increased. 
Moreover, these projects become more formal, with more integrative industrial 
linkages at the firm level, through the creation of international joint venture 
companies. As mentioned above, international cooperation can be in the form of 
co-development and co-production. The management of such cooperative 
ventures was handled through consortiums. These are ad hoc mechanisms, which 
clearly delineate “[...]the responsibilities of each corporate or national 
participant, especially in ensuring that each partner receives a value of 
production work equal to its investment in the program (a process known as juste 
retour, fair return).”86  
Some examples of successful collaboration examples include the Harrier 
program, F-16 program, and Spanish F/A-18 program. Such successes depend 
on: a) program being identified as a high-priority project among the participating 
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countries, b) limiting  the number of participants (larger number of states will 
mean lots of national requirements to be met) c) a program that is likely to 
generate and sustain support from various political constituencies in the 
respective countries, d) obtaining commitment from countries to buy a “critical 
mass” which is defined as a number that permits the non-recurring development 
costs to be allocated while maintaining a total per unit cost that is politically and 
economically affordable e) providing sufficient industrial incentive to overcome 
political obstacles, f) possibility of potential conflicts of interest among 
participants, g) understand potential impact of  technology transfer issues on the 
ultimate marketability of product.87  
As a result of the success in these programs and gains, defense firms 
individually go global. European firms chose to cooperate with each other, and 
sometimes did not even acknowledge their governments. These collaborative 
programs were not only specific to Europe or transatlantic relations. Third World 
countries also adapted their industries in accordance with globalization. Such 
cooperation may be among themselves, or it may be with the first world 
countries, such as the Italian-Brazilian AMX attack jet, or the K-1 tank jointly 
developed by South Korea and the United States. Israel has engaged in licensed 
production with Taiwan and South Africa for its Gabriel anti-ship missile.   
Despite these successes, there were also failed projects. They were due to 
“[…] over administration, poor coordination at the R&D stage, lack of 
competition in component production, and excess production capabilities.”88 
Other challenges for collaborative projects include examples where firms might 
no longer deliver the goods in question, or states might back off their 
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commitment to a given weapon systems because of changes in strategy and 
international relations. 
 
 2.3.2.3. Offsets   
Also relevant to the discussion of collaborative ventures is the fact that the 
use of offsets increased substantially during the globalization process, especially 
in the case of Third World countries. Offsets are generally considered desirable 
by importing countries for a number of reasons. For one thing, straightforward 
arms imports create dependency on the exporter country. Moreover, there are 
fewer economic benefits for the importer. Offsets, on the other hand, can help 
promote internalization of technology, employment in the importer country, and 
reduce the unit cost of the weapon. However, these advantages can be realized 
only when there is an industrial infrastructure to manage these successes.89 As 
Struys emphasized 
 
[O]ffsets re-enforce the observation that states with a significant pre-existing 
defense R&D and production capability are equipped to assimilate 
technology transfer in terms of both recipient value-added, and the ability to 
apply know-how gained through licenses to independent national designs. 
Correspondingly, states with limited pre-existing defense industrial 
capabilities have found offsets to be costly and lengthy process involving 
little genuine technology transfer.90  
 
 
In addition to collaboration, there are also other methods for defense 
companies to cope with decreasing budgets. One is conversion to civilian 
production. Military firms can spin-off to civilian ones as the result of their high-
tech assets. This process can be restricted to the diversification of products to 
civil industry, rather than wholesale restructuring of the defense firm in question.  
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However, “most recent empirical studies reveal a decided aversion on the part of 
many heavily defense-dependent firms to such approach”91
 
 2.3.3. Challenges of Globalization and the Civilianization of Defense 
Industries   
Globalization also presents challenges to the defense industry. Firstly, as 
arms exports or cooperation programs increased, technological transfer also 
increased. The technology transferred to these states could potentially be used as 
a weapon against the exporters, which actually occurred in the case of the Gulf 
War, or the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, these technology transfers enabled 
Third World countries to set up their own defense industries. In the face of 
embargoes by the Western powers, these countries would be able to develop 
sophisticated weapons by themselves. Moreover, these countries could also 
export the arms acquired through technology transfer to other Third World 
countries that were in conflict with their neighbors.  
The increase in transfers involving high technology has the potential to 
increase militarization in the world and cause conflicts to become bloodier. In 
order to counter this threat, Western states need to focus on the cooperative 
export mechanism. However, there is also another challenge in this respect. 
Whatever the outlook of the producer countries (European countries are 
favorable inclined to exporting, whereas the United States is not), dual-use 
products will inevitably cause difficulty in controlling export materials. These 
characteristics of defense industry in the age of globalization have been described 
as the “civilianization of the defense industries”. According to Pierre de Vestel, 
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these industries should internationalize and should be subject to free market 
conditions and competition. De Vestel notes that the technological content of 
weapons also shifted to the extent that it now often comes from civil origins. “As 
result of these factors, defense industries and markets are adopting characteristics 
of civil economy mutatis mutandis, adopting these characteristics in accordance 
with the specific nature of the defense domain and national circumstances.”92  
Another consequence of globalization was increase in defense budgets in 
Western countries. For, globalization leads to progressive erosion of the military 
technologies of Western countries. “[I]n attempting to aid their defense industrial 
bases, the industrialized countries could be trading away short-term gains that 
could eventually lead their military challengers to be more technologically 
advanced”93. Besides, Third World countries could conceivably threaten Western 
technological improvements. Thus the West might increase its defense budget in 
order to sustain its technological level. Moreover, globalization may foster the 
development of weapons of mass destruction. Some types of collaboration on 
dual-use technologies such as missiles and long-range aircraft could reduce the 
time and cost of developing nuclear weapons. 
 Following the above analysis of the defense industry, the next chapter will 
focus on the emergence of Turkish defense industry and pros cons in the Turkish 
defense market. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
We must continue to implement the measures that were enforced to develop and 
extend our industrial capabilities and we must particularly keep military 
requirements in mind in the context of our industrialization efforts. 
 
M. KEMAL ATATÜRK-1937 
 
Turkish defense industry has not been as effective regarding the production 
of weapons as some of its counterparts in other countries, although, Turkey’s first 
attempts to establish its own defense industry were in the fourteenth century. 
Turkey has relied on imports in order to meet the needs of its armed forces. When 
its defense industry was evolving, Turkey experienced vicissitudes concerning 
such arms imports, which led policy-makers’ to attempt at developing an 
indigenous defense industry. While some of these attempts were successful, many 
of them failed.  
 Reasons to Acquire a National Defense Industry  
Turkey’s geostrategic location is one of the prime factors to explain 
establishment of its own defense industry. Turkey is surrounded with states that 
have different cultural and political backgrounds. In this neighborhood, there are 
also countries that are indicated as a threat to international security by the 
international community. Moreover, Turkey has neighbors with relatively 
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stronger defense capabilities relative to Turkey. Middle Eastern neighbors 
especially Iran have been pursuing nuclear weapons capability. Turkey has been 
committed to international agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation such as 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result of this, Turkey managed its defense by 
focusing on its deterrent capability by conventional weapons. This capability 
would gain importance by strong defense industry that is able to produce high-
tech weapons. This point is also supported by Western countries which perceive 
Turkey as a “buffer” against possible threats from Turkey’s vicinity.  
 
Apart from Turkey’s NATO obligations, Ankara has maintained its regional 
perspective on security problems. Because of its regional geopolitics, Turkey 
has somewhat a distinctive position within the Alliance. The Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF), therefore, planned and carried out reforms with a view to 
maintaining the capability to operate either in tandem with the allied countries 
or alone.94      
 
As indicated above, the development of a defense industry is not a new 
phenomenon for Turkey. Since the Ottoman times, the defense industry has been 
a focal point for the country’s industrialization efforts. This chapter will focus on 
the evolution of the Turkish defense industry, and then evaluate today’s Turkish 
defense industry and its problems. 
 
3.1. Historical Evolution of Turkish Defense Industry 
 
3.1.1.Ottoman Period 
During the Ottoman period, military power was utmost importance for 
empires and nations. Having technologically developed equipment was a way to 
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triumph during battle. For this purpose, Mehmet II (Mehmet the Conqueror) 
ordered the production of mortars in Edirne, Istanbul, Erzurum and Birecik. This 
period was also significant in the sense that the production of these materials was 
based on research and development. For example, following the production of 
mortars, the idea of using them on the empire’s ships and ripped mortars was also 
implemented by the R&D process in the Ottoman Empire. In the fifteenth century, 
the Ottoman navy yards were the most advanced ones in Europe. These yards 
could produce 137 ships at one batch.95  
Even during the period of its decline, the Ottoman Empire did not give up its 
efforts to produce technological equipment. During the nineteenth century foreign 
experts were invited to help in the establishment of military institutions. For 
example, submarines were manufactured with the assistance of English officers. 
Despite these attempts, technological backwardness of the military was one of the 
reasons of Ottoman decline. Moreover, the economic decline of Ottoman Empire 
and World War I did not bequeath a substantial defense industry to the new 
Turkish Republic. The republic inherited only navy yards, gunpowder plants, and 
some continuation and maintenance supplies and equipment that were brought 
into Anatolia secretly during WWI. 
 
3.1.2. Early Republican Period: 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk96 stressed the importance of the defense industry 
during his speech at the İzmir Economic Congress in 17 February 1923: He 
declared that during Turkey’s industrialization period, defense industry should not 
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be left out.  The decision to set up an integrated light weapons and ammunition 
industry in Kırıkkale was first taken at the İzmir Economy Congress. Moreover, 
in 1921 the General Directorate of Military Industries was set up.  The 
government prioritized the establishment of a number of defense industry 
facilities. These were  
[I]n 1924, a facility for the repair of light weapons and artillery another 
facility for ammunition and carpentry was set up in Ankara; in 1927 a 
new ammunition facility was set up in Ankara, followed by a capsule 
factory in Kayaş in 1930, a power plant and steel facility in Kırıkkale in 
1931; a facility for gunpowder, rifles and artillery in 1936 and a facility 
for the gas masks in Mamak in 1943.97  
 
3.1.2.1. Establishment of Private Defense Company 
Beside the state firms, a private defense company was also established 
during the Atatürk period. For example, the Nuri Killigil Enterprise was a private 
industrial enterprise that could produce weapons, such as pistols, 81mm mortars 
and ammunitions, explosives and pyrotechnics. This company also sustained 
necessary equipments for Turkish Armed Forces during the Second World War.   
Navy yards that were inherited from Ottoman Empire were also modernized in 
this factory. In 1929, for the repair of battleship Yavuz , the yard that had been in 
Haliç was moved to Gölcük. In addition to this, a new yard was established in 
Gölcük and in 1941; the Taşkızak navy yard was reopened.  
 
3.1.2.2. Important Developments in Aircraft Sector 
Aside from these attempts, the most successful ones occurred in the 
aircraft sector. In 1926, the “Aircraft and Motor Turkish Joint Stock Company” 
                                                 
97 SSM, SSM ve Türk Savunma Sanayii-SSM and the Turkish Defense Industry, (Mönch 
Yayıncılık: Ankara, 2005) p. 5  
 55
(TaMTAŞ-Tayyare ve Motor Türk A.Ş.) was set up. The German98 company 
Junkers was a partner in this joint venture. The TAMTAŞ facilities in Kayseri 
began production in 1928. By 1939 “[…] a total of 112 aircraft- 15 German 
Junkers A-20s, 15 US Hawk fighters, 15 German Gotha liaison aircraft- had been 
produced.”99  This factory was a first class aircraft factory. However it was closed 
down as a result of a dispute over a license which led to the breakup of the 
German partnership. Aircraft production halted, although the maintenance of 
Turkish Air Forces’ planes continued.100  
In 1941, the Turkish Aviation Association (Türk Hava Kurumu-THK) set 
up an aircraft factory in Ankara. This was the first independent attempt to 
establish an aircraft industry in Turkey. In this factory, several aircraft and gliders 
were produced. These were the “[…] Miles Magister trainer aircraft, twin-engine 
ambulance aircraft, the THK-10 light transport aircraft and the 60 Uğur two-seater 
trainer aircraft”101  The first aircraft engine factory was also established in Ankara 
in 1948. In addition, in Malatya, various facilities were built to repair the aircrafts 
procured from the United Kingdom during the Second World War. A private 
factory was also founded in the aircraft sector. Nuri Demirağ, who was one of the 
wealthiest men in new Republic, owned this company. With the license with 
Germany, this establishment was able to produce 24 aircraft and gliders. 
However, the factory was closed in 1943. 
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After the Second World War the most expensive investment in defense 
industry around the world was made in the Turkish aircraft sector.102 A wind 
tunnel was established in 1947. This tunnel would enable engineers to determine 
the effect of air on materials by creating an artificial air direction. One-third of the 
national budget was devoted to sustaining this venture, which is another 
indication of the emphasis placed on R&D during that period. However the 
project was not fully completed because in the 1950s American aid would stop 
the R&D process in Turkey. In 1967, Brodcard specialist from France came to 
report the wind tunnel. (This was a NATO field study.) They reported that this 
wind tunnel had been one of the most successful tunnels in Europe, as a result of 
its design and construction. In 1994 there was an attempt to re-start this project 
but it failed.103    
 This tunnel was one of the pillars of Turkish defense industry policy in 
1947. The other two were establishing aircraft and engine industries and setting 
up a technical university which would teach aircraft engineering. As a result of 
this plan, İstanbul Technical University opened the branch of aircraft engineering. 
Moreover the THK’s facilities in Ankara were broadened and turned into the 
aircraft engine and maintenance industry.          
In conclusion of the pre-Cold War period “[Turkish] arms industry 
expanded to meet the internal security requirements of the new state and later as 
part of a state-led industrialization surge. Turkey even established the nucleus 
aircraft industry.”104
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3.1.3. Cold-War Period 
 
During the Cold War period, Turkey received grants and credits from the 
NATO allies, especially from the United States.  However, these aids halted the 
defense industrialization period in Turkey, because they were more effective in 
meeting defense needs than the indigenous production. The imported weapons 
were also technologically advanced than Turkish products. Thus attempts to 
develop the country’s own defense industry faltered. As Turkish defense industry 
could not meet Turkish Armed Forces’ demands, meeting it from outside became 
a burden for the national budget. As a result of this, the defense industry went to 
reorganization. 
 
3.1.3.1. Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation- (Makine Kimya 
Endüstrisi Kurumu-MKEK)   
The General Directorate of Military Industries was re-organized under the 
name Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (Makine Kimya Endüstri 
Kurumu-MKEK). Law numbered 5591 empowered MKEK to buy THK. This 
corporation was operated as a State Economic Enterprise. MKEK produced 
MKEK-4 training aircraft. However, the production of aircraft was soon halted 
and the factories were turned over to maintenance and continuation. Licensed 
production of foreign products such as Sidewinder and Bullpup missiles was 
another function of these factories. These facilities had the capacity of producing 
500 aircraft and grinders. However technological advances outdated the usage of 
propeller planes. Aircraft with jet engines entered the market but MKEK could 
not update its technological base. Because of the government’s import policy, all 
 58
of these production facilities were turned into civilian enterprises. For example, 
the engine factory was turned over the Turkish Tractor Factory and others were 
transformed into textile factories.105  Yet despite these developments during the 
period between 1954 and 1958, Germany ordered 740 million DM worth of 
equipment. MKEK entered in the period of investments. Between 1956 and 1974, 
MKEK completed 18 investments and the value of this corporation increased 6 to 
7 folds.106  
 
3.1.3.2. Foreign Aids 
The aids and grants from abroad were the main reason for the stagnation 
of the development of a Turkish defense industry. The US’ aids which were the 
execution of Truman Doctrine, was divided into four areas: donations, Foreign 
Military Funds /Foreign Military Sales credits, commercial credits and training 
support.  
Donations:  With this aid, Turkey was able to procure M-47/48 tanks, 
howitzers, aircraft and ammunition. Donations were gradually phased out during 
the 1970s. The military ammunition aid, which was out of use, was lastly used 
during the Southern Flank Agreement. F-4E (Phantom II) and T-38 (jet trainer) 
aircrafts and old Perry class frigates were also acquired by donations. 
FMF/FMS (Foreign Military Funds/Foreign Military Sales) credits: This 
type of aid was started after 1972. During 1975-1980, these credits were cut as a 
result of embargoes. They were reinstated in 1980 and went on until 1998. These 
credits were initially in the form of donations. However, they were then 
transformed into long-term credits with a 5% interest rate.  
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Training Support: Turkey has been active in a program called 
International Military Education and Training107. This aid costs one-two million 
dollars in a year. This program has been defined as  
[…] it is a low-cost grant program ($26.35 million in FY 1995) that provides 
professional military education and training to more than 3,300 foreign military and 
civilian personnel from over 100 countries annually. Over half a million foreign 
personnel have been trained through IMET sponsorship over the past three decades. 
By attending IMET-sponsored courses and programs in the United States, future 
leaders of foreign defense and related establishments are exposed to U.S. values, 
regard for human rights, democratic institutions, and the role of a professional 
military under civilian control. 108
 
Not only the United States but Germany as well offered aid to Turkey.  
German aids came in the form of weapons that were produced according to new 
technologies. Turkey could also use these technologies in civil industry. This aid 
was also useful in the establishment of calibration facilities and other small 
weapons productions.  
 
3.1.3.3. Domestic Efforts besides Foreign Aids 
During this period, Turkey was able to make two attempts to further 
develop its own industry. One was establishment of a factory to produce 
ammunition, which was in line with NATO standards. The other was the 
production of the Cobra bazooka under license from West Germany in 1967. 
Despite these attempts, policy makers could not realize the effects of aids to 
the indigenous defense industry. Turkey could procure the weapons but not the 
technology that came with the weapons. Western European countries realized 
what the situation was and questioned the motives of US aid in 1960s. Moreover, 
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Western European countries could use this aid to further development of their 
own defense industry. However Turkey incurred negative effects of being 
dependent on other countries’ during the Cyprus Crises in 1964. 
 
3.1.4. The Crisis that Helped Turkey’s Defense Industry 
To give some very brief background on the Cyprus issue, for the 
protection of Turkish Cypriots and its own national interest, Turkey attempted to 
intervene in Cyprus. However this attempt was prevented by the United States. In 
a letter, US President Lyndon Johnson109 warned Turkey not to use NATO 
equipment110 for intervention in Cyprus. Despite this letter, Turkey did intervene 
in Cyprus in 1974. Following this event, the US Congress voted to impose an 
embargo on arms transfers to Turkey.   As mentioned in the Karasapan’s article 
 
[T]hese blows to the Turkish state’s esteem and the modernization requirements 
of WWII vintage weapons which no longer sufficed to meet the country’s need 
led to the promulgation of a Remodernization Plan (REMO I) in 1970. The plan 
reflected not only the political decision to expand arms production but also the 
economic reality that foreign grants and concessionary loans could no longer 
meet the high-tech, high-cost weaponry needs of the Turkish army.111  
 
3.1.4.1. The Attempts for Self Sufficiency in Weapons Production 
The motto became “produce your aircraft yourself” As a result of this 
policy; several attempts were made to reinvigorate the national defense industry: 
first of all, the Armed Forces Foundations (of the Air, Naval and Ground Forces-
Silahlı Kuvvetler Vakfı) were established. “However, [it] did not take too long to 
realize that the actual needs for a defense industry as required by the 
contemporary conditions could not be met only through donations given to these 
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foundations.”112 After the military foundations, a number of civilian foundations 
and private companies were set up. These included İŞBİR Electronics, KÖYTAŞ, 
SİDAŞ, ASKALSAN, OTOMARSAN, ASELSAN, TUSAŞ, Kalekalıp and 
Parsan. These newcomers along with the international situation caused Turkish 
policy makers to realize the importance of R&D. However, these firms and 
MKEK because they were using old-technologies had too many employees and 
were not working to full capacity could not compete in the foreign market. 
 In 1975 Ministry of National Defense (Milli Savunma Bakanlığı-MSB) 
prepared “Defense Industry Association” law. This draft proposed transforming 
MKEK into an association under the MSB. However, Turkish Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce (Sanayii ve Ticaret Bakanlığı-STB) opposed the draft. 
The reason was that defense industry was a part of the national industry and as 
such should be under their oversight. STB also noted that MKEK had been 
producing civilian goods and should therefore not be part of the Ministry of 
National Defense.     
 
3.1.5. 1980s: Attempts to Foster the Defense Industry 
 
3.1.5.1. Liberalization Efforts in Turkish Economy 
Turkish economic policy before the 1980s was based on the import-
substitution model. This model also applied to the defense industry. According to 
this model, weapons imported from abroad would be produced inside the country 
at the same quality under the license. ISI was based on cooperation with the 
exporting state. However, if the domestic market was a small one, then the 
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production of weapons inside the country would be impossible. In addition, 
because of structural difficulties and economic bottlenecks, modern weapons 
production has become more difficult. The reason is modern weapons require a 
huge investment. Yet despite these difficulties, some countries, such as Israel, 
Argentine and India, were successful in acquiring a defense industry through the 
import substitution model. These countries devoted much more attention to the 
defense industry than to the industrialization of the nation as a whole.113  
Countries that could not make the import substitution model work for 
them turned to the export-orientation one. This model focuses on exports with the 
firms that export being supported by the government. It also comprises the 
liberalization of economic policies and free market regulations. Because of their 
economic situation, developed countries adopted this type of regime after the 
1970s114.   
   As outlined above, Turkey had implemented the policy of import-
substitution model in the beginning of 1950. However, because of a lack of 
investment and economic instability in the market this model for the defense 
industry collapsed. In the 1980s, Turkey initiated export orientated economic 
policy. As Akgül emphasized “[t]he major change in the economic policy of 
Turkey, since the beginning of 1980, has been to reduce the role of the state in 
economic and commercial activities and to confine it to infrastructure and socio-
economic investments.”115 This new policy was also applicable to the defense 
industry with slight differences. The state monopoly in this sector was preserved 
until 1985. Private industry for defense sector has also encouraged for the 
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investments. Until this time, private industries were forbidden to intervene in 
domestic defense market. Moreover, foreign investments for this sector were 
welcome after 1980s.  
[A]fter the adoption of the new economic policy, the Turkish authorities 
decided to apply a more liberalized policy towards the establishment of a 
modern defense industry in Turkey, mainly by the help of the Turkish private 
sector in collaboration with foreign technology know-how and capital. The 
instruments of this new policy have been laid down in Act No. 3238 enacted 
in November 1985.116
 
 
3.1.5.2. The Establishment of New Organization for Defense Industry 
                                                                                                                                    
This act initiated not only the liberalization of Turkish defense industry 
but also the foundation of a new body. Law numbered 3238 created the Defense 
Industry Development and Support Administration (Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme 
ve Destek Merkezi-DIDA-SSGDM) and established the Defense Fund. The 
predecessor of this body Defense Hardware Administration General Directorate 
had been set up in 1983. “However, the shortcomings stemming from [this 
directorate’s] public owned status hampered the success of this enterprise, and all 
properties of that enterprise were transferred to DIDA117 or with its new name 
Undersecretary for Defense Industry118.  
However, this new policy was objected to in some quarters in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TGNA) and governing elites. The law stipulated that 
DIDA would acquire the assets of the military foundations, and that MKEK 
shares would also be sold to the private sector. However, the civil and military 
élite were opposed these changes.  
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[T]he military brings its traditional view of civilians as undisciplined, bickering, and 
used to easy profits. This led to a March 1986 decree prohibiting private sector 
production of lethal equipment the refusal of the military foundations to turn over 
their assets to DIDA reflects this attitude as well.119  
 
Not only elite but also public opposition could be observed during the 
discussions in the TGNA. Murteza Celikel of the Democratic Left Party opposed 
the idea of privatization of defense industries and asked what would happen if 
there were a strike in these companies.120  
However, despite such opposition the liberalization of the defense market 
began. Additionally SSM was set up in 1985. Besides, this body firstly was 
established apart from bureaucracy. The then Undersecretary Vahit Erdem 
outlined their aim for the defense industry in Turkey as follows;  
 
[Turkish] objective is to bring its domestic defense industry to a level which 
will produce economically feasible military products necessary for the 
modernization of the TAF, with the ability to follow and easily adapt to the 
latest technology. Therefore Turkey will be able to play the role her friends are 
expecting and put fewer burdens on her allied countries.121
 
3.1.5.3. The Boom Period in Turkish Defense Industry-Project Based Defense 
Companies 
 With the establishment of the DIDA (and then SSM), the Turkish defense 
industry entered into a boom period. Moreover, the first joint-venture project was 
implemented during this era. Turk Uçak Sanayii A.Ş. (Turkish Aircraft Industry-
TUSAŞ)  formed an alliance with US company General Dynamics and started to 
produce F-16 aircraft. This joint venture also reformed the basis of the Turkish 
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aerospace industry by creating Turkish Aerospace Industry (TAI) Company. In 
1987 an aircraft engine factory was opened.  
[TAI] has produced 278 F-16 jet fighters, 46 of which have been exported to 
Egypt, and the rest have joined the Turkish Air Force. Turkish partners hold 51 
per cent of the shares in TAI; General Dynamics and General Electronic have 
49 percent of the shares. Thanks to this project, Turkey’s new domestic aircraft 
industry has made considerable progress in the 1990s and Turkey has acquired 
new technology. In addition it has contributed greatly to improving managerial 
capabilities that can carry over the next generation of aircraft production 
projects.122  
   
 Thus the first step in the development of a liberalized, modern defense 
industry in the 1980s occurred in the aircraft industry. This was done on purpose, 
for the reason that the technology used in aircraft industry was the most advanced. 
It could therefore serve as a “locomotive technology” for the defense industry.  
However, TAI was not only company that was created through a joint venture. 
Others included FMC-NUROL, MARCONI and THOMSON. These companies 
were project-based. In another words, the foreign partners could leave the market 
when they thought they had finished what they had come to do.  
 The Defense Industry Fund that was established by the Law numbered 
3238 enabled such joint ventures or the private sector to take part in the industry. 
The fund would support new companies and try to eliminate uncertainties about 
the market. New companies had not gone into the defense business because of the 
risk in the market. This fund would be a kind of insurance for such companies. 
 The creation of a defense industry with the help of joint ventures was also 
a part of the export-oriented policy adopted by Prime Minister Turgut Özal. This 
cooperation enabled firms to acquire technological infrastructure and know-how, 
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and increased employment opportunities. Not only forming coalitions but also 
offsets123 that have entered into arena in this term intensified these attempts.124  
 However, the R&D that was the real basis of such projects did not receive 
much attention. “Theoretical frameworks on science and technology and prepared 
reports could not be successful at defense needs productions and exports because 
of not having a clear policy on R&D.”125 The money devoted to R&D during this 
period was only 0.3% in the MSB Budget.      
 
3.1.6. Post-Cold War Period 
 
3.1.6.1. Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy  
 
The 1990s, a decade which changed world politics had a corresponding 
effect on Turkish politics also. Turkey had been a vital ally for the United States 
and NATO because of its geo-strategic importance.  The United States assisted 
Turkish military in meeting its needs as a result of this. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, it was thought that Turkey would lose its importance and this 
would hamper industrialization efforts in the country’s defense sector. Most joint 
ventures during the ‘80s took place with the help of the US government and US 
companies. 
Not only international politics but also regional conflicts in the vicinity of 
Turkey altered Turkish defense policies. Military strategies to counter “new” 
threats were developed. In 1998, a Whitebook, outlining Turkish national defense 
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policy was published. According to it, new strategies would be based on 
“[d]eterrence, military contribution to crisis management, forward defense, and 
collective security”126. The last two concepts were developed after the Cold War. 
The so-called “2 ½   strategy”127 also affected national defense policy. According 
to this strategy, Turkey should be prepared to fight a two-front conventional wars 
and guerilla warfare. The army therefore should be prepared for two possibilities.  
 
Firstly, the Ground Forces and Air Forces should first slow down an intensive attack 
backed by the armored vehicles and then repulse it by means of a deepened defense 
tactic. Secondly, the ground forces and gendarmerie forces would eliminate the 
internal threat based on the concept of zone control. […] Thus possible wars would 
take place on Turkish soil.128   
 
Not only has the protection of its territorial integrity but also contributing to 
regional security included in the new defense policy. In order to meet this 
objective, it would be necessary to restructure TAF. The Whitebook listed the 
following requirements:  
    
• Deterrent military force, 
• Command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance 
and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, 
• Superior operational capability and fire power, 
• Advanced technology weapons and systems based on the principle of 
quality rather 
Than quantity, 
• Air/missile defense and NBC protection capability against weapons of 
mass 
destruction, 
• Capability for rapidly transforming from a state of peace to a state of war, 
• Capability for performing various types of operations such as supporting 
peace, 
supporting crisis management, use of limited force, blockade, embargo, aid in 
natural 
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disasters, humanitarian aid, prevention of migration, and fighting against 
terrorism, besides classical warfare, 
• Capability for performing joint and combined operations and 
• Capability for being able to reciprocally use the armed forces of the 
alliance member 
countries.129
 
3.1.6.2. Modernization Efforts of TAF and Technology’s Increasing 
Importance  
The need to match capabilities with policy affected the Turkish defense 
industry. Efforts to modernize TAF were initiated. Although these efforts had 
their roots in 1987, with the changing nature of security threats after the Cold 
War, they became a more urgent issue on the agenda. Modernization would be 
mainly based on technology. For example, the C4I (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence) technology became one of the 
most important priorities during the era. The modernization of major weapons 
systems and their production within Turkey was another central issue in this 
period. The TAF stated that the concept of modernization means that money for 
the requirements of TAF, will be spent to develop our national defense 
industry.130  
Another indication of the emphasis on technology was the establishment of 
Defense Technology Engineering (Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendisliği-STM) in 
1992 at the decision of Defense Industry Executive Committee. The mission of 
this agency was to  
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[P]rovide support to Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and Undersecretariat of Defense 
(SSM) in systems engineering, technical consulting, project management, 
technology transfer and logistics support and to establish and maintain centers in 
software development, maintenance and technical assistance for the Turkish 
Defense Industry.131  
 
The STM staff’s expertise would be in the area of defense technology, 
including the testing and determining technical aspects of weapons and 
systems/subsystems. During the period between 1991 and 1993, STM provided 
assistance for projects such as Peace Onyx, as well as various software systems. 
The first assistance programs were based on aircraft projects. Moreover, STM 
was also involved in some projects for land forces, such as Remote Video Control 
system for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).    
The reason that technology became so important for the Turkish Armed 
Forces was the consequences of the First Gulf War. In 1991, after the experiences 
of Gulf War, Turkey started to insist in the transformation of structure of its 
Armed Forces into a high level of mobility and fire power, using high-tech air 
defense, communication, electronic equipment.132 Insisting on professionalism 
also required reduction of manpower. This process could be observed in the 
decision in 1992 to shorten the period of conscription. 
 
3.1.6.3. Changes in Technology Acquisition Method 
The method used to acquire technology was also another debated issue. 
Turkey had tried to acquire technology by procuring weapons. However, this 
policy did not work. Technology did not come automatically with the weapons. 
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Exporter countries have been hesitant to transfer important technologies. As a 
result of this, Turkey lagged behind in technology and defense industry race. This 
weakness was also emphasized during the restructuring of the defense industry in 
the post-Cold War period. 
The policy of TAF was that if a technology was not domestically produced, 
it should be acquired by means of international cooperation. However, this 
method was to be used only if Turkey was not capable of producing the item in 
question by itself. Besides international cooperation in the defense industry 
should be with NATO or Western European Union (WEU)133. The TAF’s 
insistence on this issue had defense companies be part of NATO’s Allied Quality 
Assurance Publications (AQAP) in 1988. This program was intended to bring 
about standardization in the defense industries of NATO in areas such as the 
security of the industry and timing. However, the Turkish defense industry did not 
fully meet the requirements in this perspective. In the White Book, the projects 
being done with these groups134 were mentioned and it was indicated that these 
projects were to be supported by the government. However, the cooperation 
between allies was to be based on reciprocity and the procurement of R&D and 
technology.135
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3.1.6.4. Modernization of Land  Forces 
 Technological improvements were generally led by the modernization of 
aircraft sector. During this period, the TAF’s aircraft were updated. Plans also 
called for  “[…] the upgrading of F-5, F-4 and F-16 aircraft in electronics and 
avionics to give the Turkish air force nighttime and all-weather capability.”136 
Another area was the modernization of land forces. Turkish policy makers 
emphasized that Turkey would sustain deterrence capability against its 
southeastern neighbors with the highly mobile fire-power of its land forces. As a 
result of this, TAF land forces were restructured into a professional army, by both 
shortening the period of conscription and modernizing weapons and equipments. 
Specifically, equipment such as artillery, wheeled armored personnel carriers, 
surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft systems would be upgraded or procured to 
gain more firepower and mobility. As mentioned in the Hickok’s article, 
 
[The] Turkish land forces had slowly been transitioning from division 
and regimental command structures to the American-style brigade 
organization... Ankara decided to move forward on co-production of 
main battle tanks to replace outdated vehicles scheduled to phase out of 
service in 2000 and of attack helicopters to provide greater mobility and 
organic air supports.137  
 
 
3.1.6.5. Modernization of Navy Forces 
Despite the emphasis on aircraft and land forces projects, navy 
modernization was in fact better defined and institutionalized. “The main reason 
[emphasis on navy force’s modernization] may be the stable relationship with the 
German shipyards since 1970s. German shipyards sold to Turkey navy equipment 
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worth 6300 million DM since 1992.”138  These sales were consisted of frigates, 
submarines and assault boats.  There was also equipment that was procured from 
the United States. However, the origin of this equipment was German. 
Nonetheless in its modernization efforts, the Turkish military did not want to be 
bound to one producer, because of past experiences. As a result of this, Turkey 
also procured naval equipment from France such as six Tripartites mine layers 
which were to be produced in Turkey. Knox and Perry type frigates were obtained 
from the US. Three Turkish shipyards, Gölcük, Taşkızak and İzmir specialized in 
maintenance and continuation services. These modernization efforts transformed 
Turkish naval forces from a “coastal navy” to a “blue water” one. In addition, the 
naval forces were also equipped with the ability to 
  
[M]aintain deterrence through its presence and exercises in the adjacent seas, control and 
protection of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCS) refugee control; humanitarian aid; 
search and rescue, environmental protection and operation against terrorism139  
 
 
As a consequence of the above policies and programs, the modernization of 
armed forces would sustain the military as follows: 
 
[The army would have] weapons systems that would establish preponderance 
over the enemy deep inside his territory, fire smart ammunition including long-
range ground-to-ground missiles, and provide a continuous and sound fire cover. 
[The army also would have] modern tanks with advanced armor and effective 
anti-tank weapons systems with organic air defense and helicopters for air assault 
troops. Machinery would rapidly erect hurdles to the enemy's mobility and open 
passages to enhance the mobility of the friendly units. Intelligence gathering 
systems would enable units at every level to detect, pinpoint, and recognize the 
enemy within the range of their capability140
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3.1.6.6. Economic Aspects of TAF’s Modernization 
The modernization efforts of TAF were to be sustained with less pressure on 
the budget. The liberalization period in the overall economic structure was 
assumed to meet this pressure. The free market idea and the privatization of 
government-owned industries were redefined according to defense industry needs. 
For example, MKEK was reformed in order to meet these requirements. The 
workforce was reduced by six thousand to improve productivity. “Some factories 
were granted self-authority the production lines which has lost their strategic 
features were charged off. Others were modernized.”141 Another important feature 
in the modernization of Turkish defense industry in terms of its economic aspect 
was the use of off-sets. The use of indirect offsets to make the production of 
weapons economically feasible also enabled the private sector to take part in the 
defense industry. This subject will be analyzed in detail in next section.  
 
3.1.6.7. New Initiative in Defense Industry Policies:  To Export 
In the post-Cold War era, nations used their defense industries to increase 
exports. This at the same time enables a defense industry to decrease its costs. The 
Turkish defense industry moved to take advantage of this system.  For instance, 
Turkish defense companies have attended firstly international defense industry 
fairs, including Paris Air Show and IDEX 93 (International Defense Exhibition 
and Conference in 1993). Such fairs were also organized in Turkey. The first one 
was IDEA 87 (International Defense Equipment and Avionics Exhibition in 
1987). The attendees amounted to 306, whereas in 1989, at the second fair this 
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number was increased to 700. This acceleration seemed to be an indication of 
Turkey’s importance for weapons-producers.  
These attempts reached such a level of success that Turkish defense 
companies began exporting their products. These exports were generally made to 
the Third World or Middle Eastern countries. Exporting companies included 
Otokar, TEI (TUSAŞ Engine Industry) and FNSS. “[…] FNSS has proved that the 
big amount of exports were not a dream for Turkish defense companies. It was 
also an indication that if there was true policies directed by the Directorate of 
Defense Industry Development and Support (Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme ve 
Destekleme İdaresi Başkanlığı-SAGEB), these dreams will come true.”142 
Moreover in 1998 the Ministry of National Defense published the Defense 
Industry Politics and Strategy Document (TDIPS-Türk Savunma Sanayii 
Politikası ve Stratejisi)143 which included some measures to encourage exports, 
such as establishing an export credit mechanism. These credits would be spent on 
advertising Turkish products and granting loans to importing countries. It was 
also specified that Turkish overseas agencies, economic and commercial 
consultants and military attachés would be responsible for the advertisement of 
these products. In addition to this, a cadre of military attachés knowledgeable on 
this issue would be responsible for exports.    
 
3.1.6.8. The Re-Adaptation of Defense Market  
   The legal framework of the Turkish defense industry was also re-defined 
through adoption of the Defense Industry Politics and Strategy Document. In this 
plan, the Ministry of National Defense defined and characterized technological 
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aspects of weapons for the first time. It was stated that technologies designed as 
“Must Be National” and “Critical” should be manufactured inside the country. 
These systems were to be produced in order to gain a technological infrastructure 
in the industry. The goal was that “Must Be National” technologies in the long 
run should be produced in and procured from Turkey’s own defense industry. 
Domestic manufactures with national security documentation would be entrusted 
with the task of producing this kind of technology. If this was not possible then 
defense market would go to subcontractor. The selected subcontractor would also 
serve as a main contractor by upgrading its performance.  
The long term development of the ability to produce “critical 
technologies” inside the country was to be targeted. Where this was not possible, 
they could be procured by joint-ventures. The Ministry of National Defense 
published the list of these technologies, in accordance with the requirements of 
the TAF. The third technology area came under the heading of “other 
technologies”. It was stated that “[i]f we are benefiting from the foreign 
technology, than the main object is that this technology should be imbibed by 
domestic firms. After this internalization process, production of this technology at 
an upper level will be supported by the Ministry of National Defense.”144        
As was discussed earlier, the defense market turned into a liberal one. In 
this respect, competition among the firms would be sustained under governments’ 
supervision. Foreign firms became indispensable actors in the Turkish defense 
market. However, because of the low scale of Turkish defense companies, they 
were not able to compete with foreign firms. Not only the scale but also 
technological aspect of imported weapons was a preferential situation for the 
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procurement agencies. As a result of this, in the new defense industry plan, it was 
mentioned that domestic firms would be supported by the government by 
decreasing 15% of the costs. Moreover, in the document it was emphasized that 
competition would provide to procure weapons which are efficient for the TAF in 
both quantity and quality at a lower cost. “[Turkish defense] industry and related 
institutions should technologically cooperate without intervening in a fierce 
competition and they should look after states’ interests”145  
However, in order to strengthen domestic defense industry, these 
categories should be left out from competitive policies. A main contractor firm 
should be elected and this firm will only produce this type of technology and 
government will procure that from the main contractor. The reason is that “Must 
Be National” and “Critical” technologies ones that sustain self-sufficiency during 
weapons production. This is the case in the contemporary world. As a result of 
this, if TPDIS emphasizes the development of defense industry; it should not 
foresee competitive policies in these areas.  
Another result of modernization period and restructuring in the defense 
market was the selling off of government-run defense manufacturing companies 
with the new plan also calling for privatization. The privatization aspect of the 
new plan was effective on this issue. Privatization of government-run industry 
was also included in the Defense Industry Politics and Strategy Document.  
 
[A] number of factories between 15-20 which are worked under the 
supervision of naval, land and air forces, will be closed because of not being 
feasible and finishing its missions. Some of them will continue their 
maintenance and continuance works… Some of them will be transferred to 
private sector.146  
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Despite these efforts “to match capabilities with modernization attempts” 
several criticisms were raised. One was that Turkey would not be able to achieve 
sufficient technological capabilities. “Turkish companies were in the process of 
giving the military the technology to make the leap to the 21st century, although 
those capabilities were limited in their geographic application.”147 In addition, the 
Turkish industry did not devote enough funds to R&D process to fully meet the 
country’s defense needs, which hindered the domestic development of defense 
technologies. 
 
3.2. Procurement System in Turkey  
One of the most important element of procurement mechanism is SSM. 
Before analyzing today’s position of Turkish defense industry, I will focus on 
Turkish procurement system. It is based on the TAF’s Planning, Programming 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) document. The Commander of Armed Forces 
prepares “Operational Necessity Study” and “Plan Capability Target Document” 
to indicate requirements. These documents are based on the Turkish National 
Military Strategy, which is defined by the National Security Council. The General 
Staff analyzes these offers and prioritize the requirements148. Necessary ones will 
be included in the Strategic Target Plan. This plan is revised every two years and 
is executed as part of “Ten Years’ Procurement Program” (On Yıllık Tedarik 
Programı-OYTEP).149  
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 3.2.1. Legal Basis of Arms Procurement in Turkey  
The main system procurement is made by the units of MSB and the 
Undersecretariat For Defense Industries (SSM). The system of defense 
procurement is based on the Public Tender Law No. 2886 and the Law of 
Undersecretariat For Defense Industries No. 3238. In Law 2886, the protection of 
public finance is aimed at, with competition being used as a means to achieve this. 
There is no protection for Turkish firms and no substitution will be made. 
However, the defense industry is exempted from this regulation as stated in the 
Article 89. This exemption is administered by the MSB which is empowered to 
regulate the defense market.  
In Law 3238, the importance of foreign technology and foreign capital is 
highlighted. Article 6 states “The committee [SSİK] is responsible for searching 
possibility of setting up production facilities with the help of Public and private 
sectors with the contribution of foreign capital and technology.”150 It is argued 
that the nationalization of defense firms is in the second place for 
policymakers.151      
 
3.2.2. Agencies Responsible Of Procurement 
  
The defense procurement agencies in Turkey are legally subordinated to 
the Ministry of National Defense. These agencies are Undersecretariat of MSB 
and SSM. The Undersecretariat of MSB executes procurement through the 
Domestic Procurement Agency, the Foreign Procurement Agency and the head of 
the R&D and Technical Services Department. These are agencies that were 
                                                 
150 SSM, SSM ve Türk Savunma Sanayii, p.15 
151 TÜBİTAK, Savunma Sanayi ve Tedarik, p.8 
 79
formed under the Undersecretariat of MSB. They are apart from SSM. They have 
their own strategies for procurement. These agencies’ procurement methods are 
based on procuring weapons from outside.  
However, the SSM is entrusted with the task of procurement by way of 
industrialization. This structure is criticized by many industrialists. These 
criticisms will be analyzed in the following chapters. However, some policy-
makers support this duality during the procurement process. For example, then 
Undersecretary of SSM Prof. Ali Ercan stated that “[SSM] procured depending on 
local assistance and domestic production. MSB’s type of procurement has been 
made by specific tender law and specific budget. Ours is a different type of 
budget and different type of payment.”152   
 
3.2.3. TDIPS and Procurement Methods  
 The main policy directive for the procurement methods to be used is given 
in the Turkish Defense Industry Policy Strategy (TDIPS). In this document, it is 
proposed that procurement be decreased urgently. The directive states that 
procurement on a last-minute or emergency basis should be reduced to a 
minimum level. This is because last-minute procurement tends to increase 
imports. The document also indicates the necessity of using the single-
procurement mechanism. In the developed nations, as mentioned earlier, 
procurement is done by one agency, such as DGA.  However, this is not the case 
in Turkey. The document also encourages procurement based on R&D. As a 
result of this, technological categorization would not be changed project by 
project. 
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3.2.4. Political Impact on Procurement   
Besides the organizational structure outlined above, politics also affects 
procurement decision. During the interview conducted with SSM Undersecretary 
Murad Bayar, he emphasized that politics did not play primary role in 
procurement decisions. However he added that in some cases politics could 
intervene, giving the example of the Armenian Genocide act in France. Despite 
this fact politics has become important input for the procurement.153
 
3.2.4.1. The Case of Attack Helicopter Procurement  
Another example of how both international and domestic politics affect 
procurement decision has to do with the procurement of attack helicopter. John 
Heeming explained this procurement as “[if] we examine the stance that our 
neighbors have taken for such a long time from a geo-strategic point of view, 
Turkey doesn’t just need the helicopters for fighting terrorism but to repel 
possible attacks from abroad.”154 In 2000, Turkish government prepared short 
lists of firms competing for this tender. In fact there were not many differences in 
the technologies offered by the various firms. In his article, Jeeming stated that 
the real issue was the politics of the matter.155 The Western countries interpreted 
the Turkish emphasis on attack helicopters as a desire to use these helicopters 
against PKK terrorists. As a result of this the human rights issue in international 
politics became the number one reason not to sell helicopters to Turkey. Turkish 
officials in turn made politically based procurement decisions. For example, a 
German and French consortium was dropped from the short list. The reason was 
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155 Ibid. 
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Germany’s policy regarding the human rights issues in Turkey. Moreover, US 
companies were also excluded from the tenders because of the US Congress’ 
emphasis on the human rights issue in regard to Turkey’s fight against terrorism.      
 
3.2.4.2. The Case of M-60 and Main Battle Tank Procurement  
Another project that was a matter of controversy for both Turkey and 
firms who were participating in tenders was the modernization of the M-60s and 
the procurement of the Main Battle Tank. Furthermore, these two projects were 
tendered at the same time. During an interview, retired General Hilmi Özkök, the 
former Commander of Land Forces was asked about the need for these two kinds 
of tanks. He responded that tanks that were to be used in peacekeeping operations 
needed to have different kinds of threats156. 
 Besides the necessity of tanks, the suppliers of these tanks became a 
public issue. The supplier firms should obtain an export license guarantee from 
their governments in order to sustain their exports to Turkey despite of political 
fluctuations.  As a result of this policy, some governments reacted Turkey by 
canceling their visits to Ankara such as Germany and France.   “[…] Politics and 
technical specifications have emerged as two equally determining factors in 
Turkey’s selection of final bidders in both projects.”157 These political criteria 
were mainly based on the human rights issues and Turkey’s fight against 
terrorism as in the case of attack helicopter. In other words, the exporting 
countries wanted to determine where Turkey could use these weapons and where 
it could not. This was unacceptable for a sovereign country. 
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The M-60 modernization program was aimed at upgrading Turkey’s M-
60s according to new technology. The IAI firm in Israel was the producer of these 
tanks. During the rapprochement that took place between Israel and Turkey in 
1996, Turkey decided to procure weapons from Israel. Israel’s role as a supplier 
in the procurement process became an important one. The reason is that Israel did 
not oppose any procurement agreement with Turkey on the basis of its human 
right record158. Moreover, Israel was also able to sustain high-tech weapons in the 
defense market. As a result of these advantages, Turkey chose to procure some of 
its weapons from Israel. In the case of the M-60 modernization, the project was 
not opened to tender. The past experience with Israel was given as a reason not to 
open a tender. However, the Islamist parties in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly criticized this position. Recai Kutan159 declared that “[As] Israeli 
troops invade the Palestinian territories and hold siege to the house of Arafat, our 
incapable government signs a tank tender with Israel… We will do everything to 
cancel this agreement through legal procedures”160. Another political controversy 
regarding Israel occurred in 2007. As result of the consequent deterioration of 
relations161 with Israel, it is thought that the defense agreements between two 
countries may be affected.    
 Delays in the projects discussed above are the result of exporting 
companies not being able to get export guarantee licenses or sustain the 
technological requirements. The attack helicopter project was delayed three times 
and the main battle tank project was delayed four times. Another important note is 
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that Turkish firms were going to be part manufacturing process of these projects. 
It was stated that “[t]he tanks will be manufactured in Turkey under the 
supervision of Kayseri Anatamir Tank Factory with the successful company and 
the building of helicopters will be carried out in Turkey under the supervision of 
TAI and successful bidder”162  
 
3.2.4.3. The Armenian Genocide Act and Defense Projects 
The Armenian Genocide Act affects the procurement of defense projects 
from some countries. Armenian Genocide Act will not be analyzed in depth; but, 
it should be stated that Turkey was accused of mass killings that happened during 
WWI. Turkish governments, in order to react the enactment of this law by 
parliaments of some states, have cancelled defense projects with those countries. 
Some companies could not attend the tender of Training Aircraft, so some states 
were exempted from the defense project because of the act.163  Aloof from 
politics, the figure below depicts in a simple way how Turkish procurement 
process works; 
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Figure 1. The Procurement System in Turkey 
 
3.3. Problems of Turkish Defense Industry  
 
So far, Turkish policy makers are generally hesitant to implement R&D 
based procurement. The main logic was that “we are not able to do everything”. 
As a result of this, the sources that should be used for the national technology 
researches in the universities were poured into the foreign centers. Besides 
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focusing on R&D, there are other problems in the Turkish defense market. These 
problems will be analyzed in this section. 
 
3.3.1. Lack of Coordination between Industry and Military  
First and foremost, coordination between the industry and the military 
should be improved. The industry’s modification of weapons system is not always 
in line with military’s demand. As a result of this, TAF chose to procure weapons 
and equipments from abroad.  Before the 1990s, the Ten Years Procurement 
Policy was not open to private industry. This resulted an advantageous situation 
for military owned companies. It also set back the development of other firms 
since they could not learn the exact needs of the TAF.164 Another issue 
concerning the Ten Years Procurement Policy is that there is no long-term 
planning regarding the requirements for the defense equipment. This part of plan 
is revised every two years and the revisions also include major changes in the 
systems required. As a result of this, a long-term planning would not be realistic.    
 
3.3.2. Problems Related With Organizational Structure 
Another problem in procurement is organizational. In Turkey, 
procurement is implemented by two different agencies which have different 
“Implementation Regulations” and sometimes, these regulations could be applied 
to the same projects. For example, during the acquisition of spare parts, 
demanding agencies (military) generally procured differently. As a result of this, 
the price of this application has increased. Additionally, the personnel in these 
agencies are not well trained on the subjects of procurement and weapon systems.  
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In the United States, for example, the personnel are trained at the Defense 
Acquisition University and eight years of experience is required. However, in 
Turkey, because of frequent appointments, there are not enough specialized staff 
members. 
 
3.3.3. Lack of Project-Based Groups  
In the developed world, the administration of defense industry and 
products are done by project based groups. There are specialized projects that are 
tasked different parts of equipment. In Turkey, this is not always the case. As 
indicated in the TOBB’s report “[i]n our regulations, there are no criteria or 
standards for the special project management according to projects, determination 
of projects’ costs and inspection. This results in discussion of each project”165 
This regulation also prolongs the time it takes to produce weapons. Another 
problem with the project management system in Turkey is that the requesting 
agency and the manufacturers do not work with each other. In the developed 
countries, the production of a weapon is divided into phases. In each phase, the 
military forces or procurement agencies and the manufacturers work together in 
order to prevent any deficiencies in the production of a system and reduce the 
need for modifications after delivery. This saves time and money and also 
increases the product levels of performance of the system. However, in Turkey, 
the requirements for the product or system are not defined clearly in case of 
domestic production. Additionally, the management of time and costs are not 
calculated for the system or equipment to be produced. The reason for this is the 
lack of cooperation between the military forces, procurement agencies and 
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manufacturers. This situation can result in substantial modifications after delivery. 
“As a result of these intensive modifications, the producer will have lots of fiscal 
burdens; will not be able to plan on the issues of time, human resources and 
budget. [The military] will not reach its targeted force capability on time and in 
full capacity.”166    
 
3.3.4. Competition Policy during Tenders   
In Turkey, the criterion for winning a tender is low cost.  This is also the 
reason why in Turkey, competition is emphasized in public tenders. However, in 
international system this is not the case. To start with, the developed countries do 
not apply a competition policy to weapons acquisition. “The national sovereignty” 
requirement is a foremost consideration for these countries. National sovereignty 
in this case means that domestic production should meet Armed Forces’ 
requirements, especially in software. Defense industry in a country should be 
strong enough to meet these demands. This is the reason why free market 
regulations are not applied in the developed countries. Moreover, a particular 
tender is selected because of an insistence on “life-cycle167” costs. This is also 
called “fair rate”. In Turkey, the national sovereignty requirement is not applied to 
weapons acquisition.168 The reason to apply liberal policies in Turkey is the 
emphasis placed on low cost when procuring weapons. In Turkey liberal policies 
such as free market and competition ideas is in practice in opposite with 
developed countries’ defense market regulations.      
                                                 
166 Ibid. 28 
167 In deciding to produce a product or service, a timetable of life cycle costs helps show what 
costs need to be allocated to a product so that an organization can recover its costs. In the weapon 
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in the public tender will include this modifications.  
168 Ziylan, Savunma Sanayii Üzerine, p.45 
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 3.3.5. Lack of Investment in R&D      
The lack of investments in R&D is one of the major problems of Turkish 
defense industry as discussed above. Policy makers tried to remedy this. For 
example, there are penalties for firms that did not operate “localization” of 
projects as indicated in their agreements. Decreasing the ratio of fees, profits and 
transfers of interests to foreign firms is another policy for localization.169 
Moreover, in interviews with the then Undersecretary of SSM, Ali Ercan stated 
that one of the aims of SSM was the localization of defense manufacturing. In 
projects overseen by SSM, the capability of Turkish firms has been analyzed. If 
these firms are unable to produce according to the projects’ requirements, SSM 
then turns to international cooperation. The ultimate level that a defense firm 
becomes a local one is when it is able to produce software systems and 
engineering part of the project inside the country.   
 
3.3.6. Structural Deficiency in Turkish Defense Market  
An important deficiency in Turkey is the overall structure of the defense 
industry. In the developed countries, the defense market is divided into two:  main 
contractors and subcontractors. The main contractors are responsible for the 
production of the most important part of the weapons, such as software systems, 
the technological requirements of main systems, and the design of equipments. 
Sub-contractors, on the other hand, specialize in the production of one part of the 
weapon. The main subcontractor does work for the same companies and are hired 
by these companies. This allows them to specialize. By giving different 
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specialized jobs to subcontractors who specialize in different areas, rather than 
having to complete all parts of the production process itself, the main contractor 
saves time and money. The government procures from the main contractor. In this 
system, it is considered important for the main contractor to be a national one, for 
national security reasons.  
In the case of Turkey, although the procurement rules make reference to a 
main contractor, in practice this system was not applied.  There is no main 
contractor firm that will be applicable to this system. Another feature is that a 
main contractor needs to invest more in technology. However, in Turkey defense 
companies are reluctant to invest in R&D. Besides the investments are not used 
effectively. In addition, in defense procurement bids, even in main contract bids, 
Turkey employed a policy of open competition. Thus foreign partner companies 
could also participate in the bids. As a result of these foreign companies’ 
advanced level of technology, Turkish firms could not compete with them. 170
However, this policy was criticized by the Undersecretary of SSM and the 
Minister of National Defense. During interviews with them, this policy was 
acknowledged as the “main mistake”171. They indicated that the competition 
policy created fierce domestic competition that did not result in any benefits. This 
policy was accused of preventing the establishment of a strong defense industry in 
the country. To remedy this mistake, in 2006, SSM initiated the project of 
“Restructuring Defense Industry” (Savunma Sanayii Yeniden Yapılandırma 
Projesi-SSYP). This project proposes the consolidation of national firms within a 
single structure “Turkish Defense Holding”. This company will be strong enough 
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to compete not only in Turkish defense market but in the international defense 
market as well.172 This project will be analyzed in the last chapter of my thesis.    
In addition to making it more difficult for strong main contractor 
companies to develop, the lack of focus on a main and sub-contractor structure, 
prevented the development of sub-contractor companies as well. In Turkey, there 
are many smaller manufacturing firms but they are not specialized in the 
production of specific weapons. By concentrating on a single area, Small and 
Medium Size Enterprises could develop their capabilities in that area and become 
more technologically advanced. However, Turkish SMEs do not in general 
specialize in defense production. 
 
3.3.7. Arguments over Categorization of Firms 
 A discussion of the structure of the defense industry also must touch upon 
the categorization of firms into “indigenous” and “national” firm. As explained 
earlier, defense firms in Turkey are divided into these two categories. However, 
these indigenous firms are generally partnered with foreign ones. Policy directives 
emphasize “indigenous” firms, and do not mention the nationality of firms. 
According to the Public Tender Law, companies that are located in Turkey may 
participate in defense tenders i.e. being Turkish is not a necessary condition to do 
so. 
  While some executives in the industry approve this system, others do not. 
Their criticisms focus on the idea that Turkish firms should receive assistance to 
advance the country’s technological level. They point out that a project-based 
firm can leave the country whenever the project is completed. Moreover, it is said 
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that because of the foreign partners, these firms are reluctant to transfer software 
systems to Turkey. Therefore, critics state that, because of the secrecy and 
security of involved in production defense industry, the government should 
support Turkish companies. The exemptions or assistance indicated in the laws 
should be granted to the national firms not foreign partnered ones. Another 
criticism is, as indicated above, that Turkish procurement system does not allow 
Turkish firms to become competitive. In addition to this, national and indigenous 
firms are not similar. National refers Turkish firms, whereas indigenous firms 
refer to the joint venture firms that are located in Turkey.  
    The government view also challenges nationalization of defense industry 
because SSM focuses on building weapons at the low costs in the short term, and 
of the best quality.  If one firm could sustain this with the upgrading of defense 
market in Turkey, then that firm could also be called a national firm.173 According 
to SSM, there is no Turkish nationalism in the defense market, which would put 
the economic structure and industrialization of country under distress.  
The supporters of this system are, of course, are the indigenous firms. 
They argue that because the firms have Turkish partners, they should be 
considered Turkish and that their aim is to improve the country’s infrastructure. 
They add that even after completing their projects, these foreign partners stay in 
Turkey and are willing to continue their partnerships. Kaya Ergenç, who is the 
chairman of TAI, states that “[t]his is an indication that these firms are profitable 
ones. Besides, this position can also be a reference that they are formed this 
partnership to invest our country.”174 Another advantage of this system, in view 
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of its supporters, is that these companies are more efficient than some state-owned 
companies, which are accused of becoming “employment warehouses” due to 
state support. 
 
3.3.8. Inability to Produce Software Systems 
Turkish defense companies have not been able to produce unique software 
systems. It is significant in a world of high technology the use of software 
systems is increasing. Despite the general trend toward globalization, nations try 
to produce software systems for defense products domestically. The reason is that 
an imported system may not be applicable to a particular country’s conditions. In 
addition to this, the exporter country could manipulate such a system whenever it 
wanted to.175 It is generally thought that these technologies should be classified as 
top secret and that a country should not be dependent upon other countries in this 
area. 
In Turkey, national firms formerly could not produce defense software 
systems on their own. By 2006, ASELSAN, Arçelik and Kordsa are able to 
produce unique software systems.  However, in order to develop this capability, 
government support was considered necessary. 176As mentioned above, in Turkey 
some defense technologies were classified as “Must Be National” and “Critical” 
ones. Nevertheless, the state did not specifically conceptualize which ones is 
“Must Be National” and which ones are not. As Aytekin Ziylan pointed out 
“[MSB] should publish which ones are secret and critical. They should indicate 
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that these are secret and these are critical so that document will work. That is not 
done so that this document is not applicable.”177 When asked why this is not the 
case, Ziylan responded that foreign companies prevented that. 
A case in point is Turkey’s efforts to acquire attack helicopters. The 
procurement of the weapon was to be based on co-production with the US 
company Bell.  SSM tried to develop critical software sources codes for the 
mission computer locally so as to have full control over the system. However the 
US administration stated that if Turkey insisted in they would delay Bell’s export 
license guarantee. The US government agreed Turkey could customize its own 
unique configuration for the attack helicopters. However this feature was the only 
25% of the software project.  
 
The letter written by Gen. Tom Walters on August 15, 2001 stated that 
Washington was ready to customize the unique configuration, but the 
Northrop Grumman-made mission computer should be used as a 
baseline produced for AH 1Z King Cobra used by the US navy178
 
The policy of US had SSM sign a contract with the Scientific and 
Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) - Marmara Research Center 
(Marmara Araştırma Merkezi-MAM) for the indigenous development of the 
mission computer for the attack helicopters. This contract indicated that 
production of mission computers would be done inside the country. The United 
States would be proud of Turkey’s insistence on the production, as emphasized by 
than Undersecretary of Defense Industry Ali Ercan. However, the United States 
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also issued another bill in order to prevent the development of Turkey’s national 
defense industry. This bill was explained as follows;  
 
[N]ow the third bill is on its way further restricting Turkish ability to develop 
the Targeting Sight System by ASELSAN. This system will also be included 
in the US FMS category, under which Washington will not transfer 
technology. If the mission computer is key in making the attack helicopter 
fulfill its fighting ability, targeting systems are equally critical in defining 
friends and foes during missions.179
 
 The reason given by American policy makers for the restriction of 
modifications to US- made products is that the credibility of the products would 
decrease. There was also the problem of interoperability between the main system 
and newly produced one. Defense industry specialists interpreted these policies as 
US restrictions on Turkey’s attempts to develop its own defense industry. 
The ability to develop its own technologies is crucial for a successful 
indigenous industry. In the globalized world, capital may travel from one country 
to another. However important technologies are restricted so that they do not 
circulate around the world. There are secret embargoes that do not allow importer 
countries to have such technologies. As Tuna pointed out  
 
[I]n order to have a strong economy, the giant institutions of defense industry in 
the world is merging with its technology, people and product. Consequently, it is 
necessary for the state and for companies which claim to be national to change 
their ways of thinking (investing in R&D), not the structures of the companies.180
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3.3.9. Lack of Independent Test Centers 
To determine their efficiency of the product, weapons systems should be 
tested. However, Turkey is also dependent on foreign countries in this respect. 
There are no independent test centers in which systems can be evaluated. The 
establishment of this kind of center is costly. In addition, in Turkey there are no 
experts who work independently from the government in this area. As a result of 
this, the successes of Turkish defense products were not independently verified.   
 
3.3.10. Lack of Governmental Support for Export 
Another problem that raised by defense manufacturers is the export 
mechanism in Turkey. The main problem is that there was a lack of trust in 
domestic manufacturers’ ability to export their products successfully. As SSM 
Undersecretary Murad Bayar emphasized “[g]enerally we conclude that if we 
produce any weapon for our needs, this will have no chance to be exported, so 
this product will not be feasible. As a result of this, we procured weapons from 
foreign countries.”181 However, this assumption was shown false by successes 
such as FNSS’s export of armored vehicle to Malaysia and United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and ASELSAN’s worldwide export of military communication systems. 
Manufacturers proposed that to further increase exports of Turkish products, 
bureaucratic agencies should establish a credit mechanism in Turkey. This would 
attract buyers overseas and increase export of goods. For example, the US grants 
FMS credits that are used to support defense companies which export their 
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products. However, in Turkey there is no such mechanism for exporting 
companies to benefit from.   
On the other hand, government agencies and officials tend to see the 
problems of the defense industry differently than manufacturers do. For example, 
according to Dr. Ercan the main problem is the mismanagement of investments 
“Until now investments in the defense industry have been equal to 3 billion US 
dollars. The annual turnover in a sector like this should be 1 billion dollars.”182 
According to the Undersecretary of SSM, the main problem is the scale of the 
defense industry. Despite these problems, there is progress in Turkish defense 
market. These developments will be analyzed below.  
 
3.4. Today’s Prospects in the Turkish Defense Industry   
Turkish defense industry arrived at its mature period. Defense 
manufacturing in Turkey can be divided into the following areas: state economic 
enterprises/military factories responsible for maintenance, project based private 
firms formed through the joint ventures with foreign partners and Turkish national 
firms. This categorization is based on the ownership status of the companies. 
However despite their numbers, the firms in these categories above still could not 
fully meet the requirements of TAF. For example, 75% of major weapon systems 
and 35% of the general requirements are still procured from outside the country. 
Despite this inefficient situation, some successes in Turkish defense firms are 
realized. I will analyze some major firms and their latest achievements. 
 
                                                 
182 Prof. Ali Ercan, “Güçlü Yarınlara Doğru-Towards Strong Tomorrows”, Savunma ve Havacılık, 
Vol. 8:1, (1999) p.13 
 97
 3.4.1. Turkish Aerospace Industry (TAI) 
 TAI was founded as a joint venture to produce F-16s. At first, TAI was 
not able to perform design tasks. However, over the course of 22 years, TAI 
completed 34 projects including software systems. Such international projects 
enabled TAI to acquire technical know-how and production capabilities. 
Adaptation to the standards of foreign has also improved TAI’s ability to compete 
in the international arena.  TAI’s customers included Boeing, Lockheed, Sikorsky 
and CASA. Moreover, TAI also possesses international certificates which 
enhance its image: These certificates are NATO AQAP-110, ISO-9001:2000, AS 
EN 9100 and AECMA-EASE. Additionally, TAI is also able to participate in 
international consortiums projects, such as A400M and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 
as a subcontractor. Moreover, with its last project, known as Phoenix-II, which 
included an offset rate of 30%, TAI acquired the capability to build the whole 
body of Super Pumas.  
 TAI achieved its success by focusing on unique software system 
production and R&D. Top management gives importance to having foreign 
partners, because of the shrinking domestic market. They also note that “[d]espite 
shrinking market, the fluctuations in the demands will disable to hold capacity at 
the optimum level.”183 The major development at TAI is its nationalization in 12 
January 2005. As a consequence of this act, consolidation has started to take place 
in the Turkish defense industry 
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[At] ‘Share Purchase Agreement’ signing ceremony held at TAI facilities on 12 
January 2005, the Lockheed Martin of Turkey, Inc. (42%) and General Electric 
International, Inc. (7%) shares of TAI were transferred to Turkish Aircraft 
Industries, Inc. (TUSAŞ). TAI, 98% shares of which belongs to TUSAŞ, is a 
stand alone Turkish aerospace company184. 
 
TAI’s participation in international projects has enabled other sectors of 
the Turkish defense industry to participate in the global defense area as well. For 
example, TAI’s role in JSF has allowed Selex Communication to participate the 
production of JSF’s lightening part. Additionally, Turkish firms are also able to 
increase exports to the third world countries 
 
 3.4.2. Machinery and Chemical Industry Corporation (MKEK) 
MKEK, as a State Economic Enterprise, was also modified as a result of 
the changes in the defense market. Until 1999, MKEK was one of the leading 
firms in the world; it was one of the largest 100 defense firms in the world. 
However, the presence of a State Economic Enterprises (SEE-Kamu İktisadi 
Teşekkülü-KİT) in the sector was criticized as to when the company incurred a 
loss, the government must compensate it. As a consequence of this, MKEK could 
be a burden for the budget. This led SSM to try restructuring MKEK after the 
liberalization of the market. However, because of the new-comers to the market, 
this organization could not compete with new comers. Reforms in MKEK did not 
satisfy expectations.  
 
3.4.3. ASELSAN 
Another important Turkish defense firm is ASELSAN which was 
established after the Cyprus Crisis of 1974. It is a national firm, whose 
                                                 
184  Historical Background is available online at: www.tai.com
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shareholder is the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation. ASELSAN was founded to 
meet the TAF’s needs for radios. Afterwards, it also gained the ability to produce 
electronic war systems, military communication systems and similar items. This 
company has become a leading one in design, development and production of 
critical and strategic electronic technologies in the areas of command, control and 
communications, electronic warfare, microwave, radar, electro-optics and micro-
electronics.   
By 2006, ASELSAN was able to produce unique systems, such as 
Pedestal Mounted Stinger System (Kaideye Monteli Stinger-KMS) systems to 
upgrade Stinger missiles. Moreover, ASELSAN won an air defense tender from 
the Netherlands Royal Land Forces in 2006. (It is ironic that ASELSAN 
originally got its start by procuring radios produced in Netherlands.)  Besides, 
KMS was specifically designed to meet the TAF’s needs. “KMS project is the 
first one which is designed in Turkey and first national air defense system. 
Moreover, [this project] is an indication of the level which shows Turkish 
technological structure in defense sector.”185 Because it is produced in Turkey, 
the modification of these weapons to meet special needs is easy. 
 ASELSAN invests in R&D. It set up a “Technology Supreme Council” 
which is responsible for researching the latest developments in defense 
technology and developing this technology within ASELSAN. As a result, 
ASELSAN could enhance its product range and started to focus on software 
systems. 
 
 
                                                 
185 Necip K. Berkman, “Ulusal Çözümler, Uluslararası Başarılar-National Solutions and 
International Successes”, Savunma ve Havacılık, Vol. 19:1 (2005) p.34 
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3.4.4. Governmental Restructuring in the Post-Cold War Era 
Full privatization is not applicable in the full sense in the Turkish defense 
market. Financial support by government to industry is needed. However, 
government for the defense market was not restricted to funding or state 
ownership of factories. In order to regulate the market effectively, various 
structures were also set up inside the bureaucracy. One of them is the 
establishment of Undersecretariat of Technology and Coordination. This 
undersecretariat consolidates the same sectors (supervising technological issues) 
under its authority. Moreover, it serves to smoothen bureaucratic hardness related 
with R&D.186 In 2000; Technology Panels were established under the authority of 
MSB. These panels are organized according to weapon systems. They also 
revised Defense Research Progress and Technological Plan.  The members of 
these panels come from the defense industry or universities. These panels are 
established as a result of the emphasis on policy of procurement based on R&D. 
However, in these panels, there are no TAF members, which is a problem for the 
head of defense firms. The reason is that TAF members are the users of these 
programs and they have the right to organize R&D processes of weapons. Their 
demands would specify the feature of weapons.    
Another established mechanism is the “Quality Management Head of 
Office,” responsible for ensuring quality control and maintenance of the systems 
that is procured by the MSB. The testing of systems and the quality management 
mechanism are also issues that were criticized by industrialists.  
 Besides establishment of new agencies, some changes took place in terms 
of procurement system in Turkey. Turkey, aspiring full membership to the EU, 
                                                 
186 Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu, “Değişen Savunma Stratejileri ve Türkiye-Changing Defense 
Strategies and Turkey”, Savunma ve Havacılık, Vol.9:4 (2001) p.13  
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has reshaped its procurement system according to new conditions. Not only 
membership to the EU, but also the desire to strengthen its defense industry led 
policy makers to focus on an effective procurement system. The new procurement 
strategy which was declared in May 2004, put emphasis on effective usage of 
national resources and greater contribution from Turkish firms in defense 
projects. The aim is to increase the rate of domestic inputs into defense 
procurement. This new strategy: 
 
[E]xcludes co-production deals. Defense requirements are to be met 
through direct purchases from abroad, or, increasingly, from local firms. 
Emphasis will be put on developing own-designed products rather than 
transfer of technology. It also encourages the domestic defense industry to 
undergo a restructuring, through consolidation of state-owned companies, 
and encouraging private companies to consolidate and/or specialize. This is 
expected to result in economies of scale.187
 
 
Another issue about procurement strategy is in line with Turkey’s 
prospective membership to the EU. So far, Turkey concluded its projects with the 
United States and Israeli companies. These countries did not focus on Turkey’s 
human rights records as in the countries in the European Union. During the EU 
accession process, European companies’ proposals could play a key role in 
Turkish defense projects. Moreover, 
  
[I]n the longer term, in particular, Turkey’s progress on the EU membership 
may change the priorities of the country. Turkey invariably tops the league of 
NATO nations measured by defense spending as a percentage of national 
income… However, EU membership, even the process of becoming a 
member, could lead to a cut back in this relatively high level of defense 
expenditure.188  
 
To sum, Turkey has been trying to acquire a national defense industry 
since the Ottoman Empire. Technological improvements were successfully 
                                                 
187  Turkish-US Business Council, Report on Turkish Defense Industry, Available on line at 
www.turkey-now.org, 01-08-2004, p.2 
188 Ibid. p. 3 
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adapted to the empire’s expansion period. However, for various reasons, the new 
Republic did not inherit any defense investments. During the early Republican 
period, Turkey attempted to acquire a defense infrastructure. However, after the 
country became a member of NATO, these attempts were halted. Nevertheless, 
various crises with supplier countries led to attempts by Turkey to develop its 
own defense industry. After the Cold War, the liberalization of the defense market 
and efforts to modernize TAF led to a boom in the Turkish defense industry. 
Moreover, since 2000, Turkish defense industry made successful attempts to 
produce unique weapon systems and export these products.  Yet despite these 
developments, Turkish defense industry has still problems, in areas such as 
procurement methods, lack of R&D investment, lack of government support to 
the defense industry, competition policies and transfer of new technologies from 
abroad.  SSM has been attempting to improve the situation of Turkish defense 
industry by implementing new policies. These policies as well as SSM itself will 
be examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE UNDERSECRETARIAT FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES 
 
 
 
The liberalization of the economy and defense market in Turkey, which 
started in 1980s, forced policy makers to regulate this market through the 
establishment of some agencies because of the defense industry’s sensitive nature. 
Turkey decided to set up a body which would undertake this mission. This 
administrative policy is not unique to Turkey.  A number of countries, as stated in 
the first chapter, have such agencies. This body would work together with military 
in order to fully meet their requirements. In 1985, the TGNA amended the 
establishment of the Undersecretariat For Defense Industries (SSM-UDI) with 
Law No. 3238.  
In this chapter, I will elaborate on the mechanism of SSM and Turkish 
defense budget. The policies regarding the defense industry, such as offsets and 
export policies, will be analyzed. In addition to this, SSM initiated new policies 
regarding the structure of defense industry in Turkey. This new policy will be also 
analyzed in the last part of the chapter.  
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4.1. Law 3238 and the Establishment of New Agency 
 Law 3238 was foreseen to sustain the liberalization of defense industry. It 
also allowed for the establishment of a new agency in the defense structure. The 
main aim of this law have been summarized as follows, 
• Maximize the utilization of national defense industry capabilities 
 
• Encourage and guide high technology investment 
 
• Obtain input of foreign technology, cooperation and capital 
 
• Foster research and development to maximize in-country 
production of defense equipment. 
 
 
 
Law No. 3238 brought about a completely new defense industry concept as well as a 
highly flexible and efficient system, which has five major components: the Defense 
Industry Higher Coordination Board, the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries, the 
Defense Industry Support Fund and the Defense Industry Audit Board.189  
 
4.1.1. Defense Industry Higher Coordination Board (Savunma Sanayii Üst 
Koordinasyon Kurulu) 
 As envisioned by the law, this body meets under the chairmanship of 
Prime Minister. It is composed of 13 members such as Minister of Economy, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of General Staff, and the Undersecretary of 
State Planning Organization and so on. The board convenes at least twice a year 
at the summons of Prime Minister. The functions of this board are, first to follow 
coordination and planning principles that are enacted by the Council of Ministers 
and second to determine procurement policies to acquire weapons indicated in the 
Strategic Target Plan by Chief of General Staff.  
 
                                                 
189 SSM, SSM ve Türk Savunma Sanayii-SSM and the Turkish Defense Industry, (Mönch 
Yayıncılık: Ankara, 2005) p. 7 
 105
 4.1.2. Defense Industry Executive Committee (Savunma Sanayii İcra 
Kommitesi-SSİK) 
 This body is the decision making part of SSM. The members of this 
committee are the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of National Defense 
and it convenes under the chairmanship of Prime Minister. As it was emphasized 
in the SSM’s book “[T]he main task of the Committee is to make decisions in 
accordance with the Strategic Target Plan regarding the domestic production and 
when necessary, the out of country production of weapons and equipment of the 
TAF.”190 This body is empowered to investigate the availability of production 
inside the country. Moreover, it encourages foreign investment in the area of 
defense production as stated in Article 6 of Law 3238. According to Law 3238, 
domestic defense industry should be directed and enlarged by the participation of 
foreign technology and investment.  
 
4.1.3. The Defense Industry Development and Support Administration 
Undersecretariat For Defense Industries (Savunma Sanayii Geliştirme ve 
Destek Merkezi- Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı) 
 This body functions like an executive committee of the government in the 
market. It reports to the Minister of National Defense and has a legal persona and 
a special budget. Its functions are summarized as follows: 
 
• Reorganizing and consolidating the existing national defense 
industry and to encourage new enterprises in line with national 
defense requirements.  
• Proposing procurement programs and funding models  
• Planning the production of weapons and equipment at private 
and state manufacturing facilities 
                                                 
190 Ibid. p. 15  
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• Conducting research and develop modern weapon system and 
equipment  
• Coordinating the export of defense industry products and offset 
trade.191 
 
4.1.4. Defense Industry Support Fund (Savunma Sanayii Destekleme Fonu-
SSDF): 
 This fund was established to sustain the flexibility of defense 
expenditures. Spending for defense projects is easily accomplished by using 
SSDF. This fund has also some privileges for the effective procurement. For 
example, the expenditures from the fund have been exempted from parliamentary 
scrutiny through Court of Audit.  The income for this fund is derived from special 
taxes on items like alcohol and tobacco, taxes from national lottery, fund charges 
from the Turkish Armed Forces Support Fund and some charges determined by 
the Council of Ministers. A sum of approximately US $17 billion has been 
accumulated by the fund since 1986.192 The properties of this fund will be 
analyzed below. 
 
4.1.5. Defense Industry Audit Board 
 The functions of Undersecreteriat and the Fund are audited by this 
committee, which is composed of personnel from Prime Ministry, Ministry of 
National Defense, and Ministry of Finance. These personnel are appointed for two 
years of service.   
 
 
 
                                                 
191 Ibid. p. 18 
192 Ibid. p. 19 
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4.1.6. Opposition to the Law in TGNA 
When the Law 3238 was passed, some members of TGNA did not quite 
welcome the Law 3238. The opposition party had sent the law to the 
Constitutional Court to be reviewed. The main premise of the law was the 
privatization of Turkey’s defense industry. Opponents declared that this act was 
inconsistent with Article 5 of Constitution.193 Another controversial issue was the 
oversight of the budget. In the draft, it was stated that the role of the Court of 
Audit was the auditing of entire governmental agencies’ spending. However, 
under the draft, the Defense Industry Support Fund would be exempted from this 
supervision. The opposition party argued that the public should have the right to 
know for what their money is channeled. However, despite these criticisms, the 
law was endorsed by the Constitutional Court.  
 
4.2. The Defense Industry Development and Support 
Administration (DIDA) / Undersecretariat For Defense Industries 
(SSM) 
Self-sufficiency in the arms production has historically been the most 
important issue for Turkish policy makers. However, establishing and organizing 
a defense industry according to the needs of the country have not been sufficiently 
thought about in Turkey. As mentioned in the second chapter, Turkish defense 
industry has been dependent on outside sources. It was unable to produce 
sophisticated weapon systems without external participation. Various embargoes 
imposed upon Turkey by allies highlighted Turkish defense industry’s limited 
                                                 
193 In this article, it was stipulated  that the state’s main task was the protection of national 
sovereignity and independence  
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capacity. On the other hand, these incidents forced military bureaucrats to focus 
on Turkish resources and to improve capacity. It has been emphasized by some 
military officers that Turkey must be more self-sufficient in armament production 
in order to maintain stability both inside country and within its region.  
  
4.2.1. Reasons to Establish an Agency 
Besides the desire to be self sufficient in arms production, there are also 
other factors for the establishment of a new agency. One factor is the Ministry of 
National Defense and its competency with democratic features of a country. Until 
1985, the Ministry of National Defense had administered Turkey’s defense 
industry. Traditionally, the MSB personnel have been predominantly composed of 
individuals from the military elite. As Narli pointed out “[t]he domestic and 
foreign procurement department in the MSB is headed by serving officers, usually 
one-star generals, while a civilian heads the SSM.”194 However, in a democratic 
country, requesting and procuring organization should not be same. The military 
side should only be responsible for determining its needs; the civilian side will 
decide the procurement of these requirements according to the budget. Only if 
there is a necessity of military expertise, than civilians will consult them. This 
common practice in the world had not been applicable to the Turkish case. The 
new agency is established to overcome this deficiency.  
Another reason for the foundation of this agency is related with bureaucratic 
harshness in Turkey. Before SSM, the system did not respond defense companies’ 
                                                 
194 Ayse Nilufer Narlı, Aligning Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Transparency Building in 
Defense Sector and EU Reforms, Available online at: 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg9_taf_110.pdf
 109
concerns and issues quickly enough. The new organization was envisioned as a 
separate entity that would sustain the time management for defense projects.  
It is important to note that Western practices have also had an effect on the 
reorganization of the administration of defense industry in Turkey. As was 
discussed in the first chapter, in countries such as France, Germany and many 
others, defense companies are directed by civilian organizations that are 
connected to the ministry of defense. The function of these organizations is to 
serve as a bridge between industry and the government. In addition, they are 
empowered to organize the defense market according to desired plans. This 
system has also been in effect in some developing countries, such as Brazil. These 
organizations have played a key role in enabling developing countries to 
indigenize and develop their defense industries. It was noted in the second chapter 
that these countries’ defense industries are generally state-owned. This helps the 
companies to gain more power in the market.  Turkey tried to adapt a similar 
system.  
 
4.2.2. The Functions and Aims of SSM 
These new circumstances and the necessity of new organization as a result 
of new policies were acknowledged by the implementation of the Law 3238. In 
this section, I will analyze the functions of SSM or DIDA formerly as well as the 
aims and policies of this body.  
           In Law 3238, as mentioned earlier, the functions of this body are described 
as follows; 
 
[SSM] is the organization responsible for all the ground work of this system, 
starting from the point where the planned requirements of the TAF are determined; 
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up to the point when the weapon, material or equipment is taken out of use by the 
Armed Forces, including logistic support. During this long and complicated 
process, [SSM] participates in strategical evaluations; issues requests for 
proposals; calls for tenders; makes technical, economic, financial and management 
evaluation and submits the final appraisal reports of the projects to the Committee. 
After the decision of the Executive Committee, the implementation of the 
programs is also carried out by the Administration, including contracts and quality 
and technology control work195. 
  
 
 In addition to the functions indicated in the law, the aims of SSM were 
also set forth in the Turkish Defense Industry Policy and Strategy Document. In 
1998, the Council of Ministers elaborated on this strategy by stipulating that “[…] 
the equipment necessary for the TAF will be sustained by domestic firms to the 
greatest extent.”196 In most of the interviews conducted for this thesis, the SSM 
undersecretaries mentioned the importance of Turkish firms’ contribution to arms 
production. From the beginning, SSM analyzed the capabilities of domestic firms 
and encouraged them to participate in the new weapons production. Moreover, 
when the TAF set forth its needs, domestic firms were able to participate in the 
tenders. SSM supported domestic firms for this purpose. This is also a difference 
between SSM and the MSB’s procurement agency. As mentioned earlier, SSM 
was to be responsible for formulating a domestic defense industry in Turkey. As 
former Minister of National Defense Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu emphasized; 
 
[W]hen SSM procures any system, it does not look at the subject from only one 
perspective: that of giving money and receiving the equipment. It is responsible 
for planning: which domestic firm will participate on what scale, which 
domestic product will be part of the project, which additional capabilities will be 
gained by the project, what gains domestic firm will acquire, the R&D aspect of 
project, the management and supervision of project, whether the project will 
                                                 
195 Vahit Erdem, “Defense Industry and Investment Projects”, Turkish Review Quarterly Digest, 
Vol.2 No.11 (Spring 1988), p. 15   
196 MSB, Savunma Sanayii Stratejisi,  (MSB:Ankara, 1998)  
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involve new investments, import dimension of the project through usage of 
offsets and the aspect of cooperation with foreign firms.197   
 
 
 SSM is responsible not only for the modernization of TAF but also for the 
procurement of equipment for the other security sectors of state. For example, 
SSM procured helicopters for the gendarmerie, police and border security forces 
and also for the Ministry of Forestry. SSM handled these contracts for different 
sectors due to its position as the only state agency with expertise in this area. 
 
4.2.3. SSM’s Working Process 
 In general, SSM’s operation starts with the decisions made by the Defense 
Industry Executive Committee. For each project that comes to SSM, a project 
group is set up. SSM also applies to SSIK for the approval of the project. After 
that, a call for proposal is made. The proposals prepared by the firms bidding for 
the project are evaluated and presented to the SSIK. After selection of the firm, 
and the signing of an agreement, SSM oversees the entire process from 
production to delivery. 
 
4.2.3.1. Criteria to Conclude a Defense Agreement 
 During the evaluation of the proposal, SSM applies two criteria. One is the 
cost of project. A lower cost figure is a factor in favor of a proposal. The second 
one is the proposal’s level of degree. The level of degree has to do with the 
characteristic and importance of system.  
 
[T]he proposal should be in accordance with the technical documents that 
indicate TAF’s requirements for capability. The proposal should also be 
                                                 
197 Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, “Değişen Savunma Stratejileri ve Türkiye-Changing Defense 
Strategies and Turkey”, Savunma ve Havacılık(Defense and Aerospace) Vol.4:1, 2001, p.18 
 112
evaluated according to its contribution to the domestic industry and to 
offsets. Moreover, administrative and economic issues are also evaluated.198
 
  There are three main criteria for calculating the system’s level of degree. 
The first is the effective use of domestic resources so that domestic contribution 
will be increased step by step. The second criterion is that domestic industry will 
receive a share of the profits. Third one is the minimum the money from the 
projects that went abroad should be tried to divert domestic resource. As a result 
of these criteria, it is foreseen that the indigenous defense industry will be 
promoted. By the application of these criteria the main system agreements signed 
by SSM are depicted as follows: 
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    Figure 2. Main System Agreements199
 
 
                                                 
198 Prof.Dr. Ali Ercan “Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Savunma Sanayii Üzerine Genel Bir 
Değerlendirme-An Evaluation Over Defense Industry in World and Turkey” (06-08-2002) 
Available online at:www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp   
199 The figure was depicted during the speech of Murad Bayar, “Opening Remarks” SSM and 
International Defense Industry Conference 14-15 November 2005, Bilkent Hotel Conference 
Center 
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4.2.3.2. Delays  
 Delays could occur as a result of the domestic economic situation. For 
example, during the economic crisis in 2001, some projects were delayed because 
of the difficulty in making payments. Such delays could take place if the 
executive committee decides that payment for the project will be made later than 
originally scheduled. Delays could also occur as a consequence of disagreement 
between countries. For example, military agreements with Israel and the United 
States were sometimes delayed because of disputes over offsets or similar matters.  
Another reason for project delays could be related to the decision-making process 
itself. Former Minister of National Defense Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu explained 
reason for these delays as “[…] the projects that were concluded recently were 
large ones. They needed in depth analysis, preparatory tests and evaluations..”200
 
4.2.3.3. The Effects of Military to SSM’s Working Process 
    
 Murad Bayar, Undersecretary of SSM, stated that until 1985, the 
procurement process had been conducted by the military personnel of the MSB. 
After the establishment of SSM, this process was managed for the first time by a 
civilian body which is SSM. He also noted that during SSM’s first years, the 
process was not always successful with delays. During that time, the military 
intervened in the decision-making process. Bayar characterized such actions as 
professionalism; stating that “[t]he main approach of TAF is this: I need this 
equipment. When you acquire this item for me in time, I will not interfere with 
your decision making process. Otherwise, for the sake of my urgent needs, I will 
                                                 
200 Cakmakoğlu, “Değişen Savunma Stratejileri ve Türkiye”, p.19 
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interfere with the process.”201 Moreover, such intervention is not in the sense of a 
coup or the like. Bayar likened this intervention as “filling the gap in the process”.        
 
4.2.4. Organization Structure 
 SSM was re-arranged its organizational structure to deal with some 
problems. During its first years, SSM was not able to organize its structure 
completely. Organization was divided into three branches. The Deputy Secretary 
for Administration and Finance was responsible for SSM’s internal matters, such 
as personnel, administrative functions and financial administration. Deputy 
Secretary for Defense Services directed Land, Navy, Air and Electronic 
Equipment Offices. Deputy Secretary of Industry Services handled relations with 
defense firms. This body was responsible for the R&D, quality management 
functions and offset policies. A Legal Advisory body was also set up within SSM. 
In accordance with Law 3238, a supervision system was established within the 
organization to oversee the functions of each body.  However, this structure has 
been revised according to sustain an effective bureaucracy. For example, in 2001,  
 
[D]eputy Undersecretaries have been created for the Defense Industrial and 
Administrative/Financial Services. Furthermore, the Directorates of Land, Sea, 
Air, Electronic Warfare and Command and Control, Weapons Ammunition and 
Rockets have been given the responsibility of project management in their 
respective areas, subordinated to the Deputy Undersecretariat of Defense Services. 
Offsets, Local Content, ATIP (Advanced Technology Industrial Park), and R&D, 
Quality Control, Foreign Affairs and promotional activities will be carried out by 
the Deputy Undersecretary for Industrial Services.202
 
 In 2004, Public Administration Law provided for the reorganization of the 
undersecretaries, except those that are directly subordinated to the Prime Minister. 
                                                 
201 Interview with the author, 23 February 2006, SSM 
202 Prof.Dr. Ali Ercan, “TSK’nın Modernizasyonu ve Ulusal Savunma Sanayiinde Yeni Hedefler-
Modernization of TAF and New Targets in National Defense Industry”, Savunma ve Havacılık 
Vol. 2:1 2000 
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The SSM was also affected by this reorganization. In this sense, SSM has focused 
on the project management groups, with each project being discussed in these 
project groups. These may include specialists from Ministry of Treasury, Trade 
and as well as personnel from SSM. Besides, there are TAF members. 
Representatives of the defense industry can also participate in these groups.  This 
enables private defense companies to present both their capabilities and problems 
regarding a project.  
 . Organization model, which focuses on project groups, is a widely known 
and applied. For example, in France, DGA was organized according to specific 
type of weapons and forces. The project management groups are another 
important branch for DGA. Some undersecretaries of DGA are directly linked to 
other related ministries. For example, DIR is directed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  
 
4.2.5. Technology Policies of SSM   
Innovations and improvements in the defense market have the potential to 
promote technological development in the country. In the past, Turkish defense 
industry was not successful in keeping up with international progress in this area. 
However, the procurement process has evolved to enable the country to catch up 
this race.  In the developed countries, this issue has been dealt with not only 
through procurement policies but also through cooperation between universities 
and defense sector. For example, universities set up cyberparks to encourage the 
development of new ideas and technologies. The first science park, Cambridge 
Science Park, was set up in United Kingdom in 1970 at Cambridge University.  
Technoparks or cyberparks can be explained as follows; 
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[Is] a space, physical or cybernetic, managed by a specialised professional team 
that provides value-added services, whose main aim is to increase the 
competitiveness of its region or territory of influence by stimulating a culture of 
quality and innovation among its associated businesses and knowledge-based 
institutions, organising the transfer of knowledge and technology from its 
sources to companies and to the market place, and by actively fostering the 
creation of new and sustainable innovation-based companies through incubation 
and spin-off processes.203
 
During the globalization process, developed countries are increasing the 
number of their cyberparks. Turkish practice did not quite follow the international 
one, although, the importance of cyberparks was realized: with the passage of 
Law No. 4691204 in 2001, TGNA laid the basis for the establishment of 
cyberparks at Turkish universities. Several incentives are granted to these 
establishments. For example, R&D personnel are exempted from income taxes for 
10 years. Companies in the cyberparks received a corporate tax reduction. 
Various privileges are also granted to academicians. As of 2007, fifteen 
cyberparks were established in Turkey. These are TUBITAK MAM Research 
Center, METU Teknokent, Bilkent Cyberpark, ITU Arı Teknokent, İzmir 
Teknoloji Teknopark, Gebze GOSB Teknopark, Konya Selçuk Teknopark, 
Hacettepe Teknopark, Kocaeli University Teknopark, Istanbul University 
Teknopark, Eskişehir Teknopark, Yıldız Teknopark, Kayseri Erciyes Teknopark, 
Karadeniz Teknik Teknopark, Antalya Akdeniz Teknopark.  The first one was the 
METU Technopark, a large facility that has spawned several innovations of 
interest of the TAF. 
 
METU Technopolis has developed very fast between 2001 and 2005. 
Currently within 61,000m2 closed areas, there are 157 companies. 2.148 R&D 
staff and 127 faculty members are involved in R&D activities. In 2004, the 
                                                 
203 Regis Cabral, “Science Parks and Technology Business Incubators as the Interface for 
Defence-University-Industry Collaborations”, SSM and International Defense Industry 
Conference,  14-15 November 2005, Bilkent Hotel Conference Center  
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companies in METU Technopolis obtained revenue of $55 million from the 
R&D activities, and they have exported goods and services worth $16 million. 
28 of these companies are in the defence industry sector. By giving great 
importance, METU established a sub-zone (SATGEB) which deals with 
research and technologydevelopment for defence industries. Turkish Armed 
Forces, Defence Industry Companies, universities, research centers, SME’s 
and public are all the  stakeholders.205  
   
Bilkent University has also some projects regarding defense 
technology. The university opened a nanotechnology laboratory. This is the 
first laboratory in this sense. In 2003, Ankara Cyberpark was established, 
and Bilkent University is a shareholder of this establishment. In Cyberpark 
there are four companies that are related with defense industry.   
 
4.2.5.1. Problems Related To Technology 
  Despite some developments in technological aspects, Turkey has still relied 
on R&D capabilities of other countries. During a conference at the Bilkent 
Conference Center, Dr. Akbulut emphasized that “[t]here have been lots to do in 
order to sustain technological developments in Turkey. First of all procurement 
agencies and those that determine the technological requirements of military 
equipments should be in harmony for the decision of weapons’ technological 
level.”206 SSM should serve as the single organization empowered to sustain this 
harmony. Moreover, technological infrastructure of universities and research 
centers should be updated. Despite the existence of twenty technoparks in Turkey, 
the R&D process is not enough to develop high-tech weapons. It could be said 
that quantity does not engender their quality.207  
                                                 
205 Prof.Dr. Ural Akbulut, “The Role of University in Defence and Development” SSM and 
International Defense Industry Conference, 14-15 November 2005, Bilkent Hotel Conference 
Center  
 
206 Ibid. 
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 Another urgent step is to increase the quality of human resources in Turkey 
and which again; related to updating technological infrastructure in Turkey. There 
are 72 universities in Turkey, from which 1.5 million students graduate every 
year. In European countries, this number is lower than a half. However, because 
of inequalities in the education system, every graduate does not have the same 
capacity. For research projects in the defense and other sectors, the human factor 
is the most important element. It was emphasized during the SSM conference in 
2005 that if the quality of this capacity is increased, then Turkey will be able to 
produce its own defense equipments. In line with the human capacity, the funds 
devoted to R&D in Turkey are not in line with the financial resources spent on 
R&D in European countries. The figure below depicts this difference.  
                                       
    Figure 3. R&D Funds208
 
Despite these disadvantages, the number of R&D projects that were 
presented to the General Staff increased. Six hundred projects have been 
concluded through the collaboration of SSM, MSB and TUBITAK. The Chief of 
                                                 
208 Bayar, Opening Remarks 
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Staff approved ninety defense projects and forty five space projects for the year 
2005 of which sixty two of them will be supervised by SSM. However, there 
remains much to do in order to increase SSM’s influence in the R&D process. 
Methods that have been employed by its counterparts in other countries could be 
of use. For example, as mentioned earlier, DGA in France is able to influence the 
content of engineering courses offered in universities. The SSM could make 
suggestions about the curricula of especially engineering faculties for the purpose 
of developing defense technology in Turkey. 
 
4.2.6. SSM’s Offset Policy  
 The importance of offsets is increasing globally, and this practice was 
reflected itself in Turkey, where policy makers have also accentuated the usage of 
offsets. Until the 1990s, offsets were applied only to large military contracts in the 
area of maintenance services. However, in 1983, Turkey experienced the 
advantages of the offset practice and used it for the joint project of F-16. As 
TÜSİAD reports on offsets indicated 
 
[The] F-16 project was the first real offset experience in Turkey. With this project, 
a modern airplane factory (TAI) and airplane engine factory (TEI) were 
established. The employment force was sustained and trained. The production, 
installation and testing of airplane and their component parts were maintained in 
the terms of agreement between contracting parties. Through this offset, 
ASELSAN acquired production technology for Lethargy Line of Navigation and 
started to produce this capability for F-16.209  
  
 Moreover, in the course of this project Turkey has learned about making 
quality control assessments during production. 
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Defense Industry, (TÜSİAD:İstanbul.1999), p.23. 
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  The SSM has the responsibility for the administration of offsets. In its 
first years, SSM concluded 31 offset agreements. However, with the Turkish 
Defense Industry Politics and Strategy document210 (1998) states that the MSB 
has the task of administering the offsets. This did not mean that SSM has been 
totally disengaged from the process. SSM and MSB work together to conclude 
these types of agreements with the MSB responsible for domestic applications 
and SSM was given the task of looking over agreements concluded with foreign 
companies. SSM is also responsible for increasing local contribution to these 
projects. 
 SSM prepared a “Handbook of Offset Regulations” in 1991 which 
systematizes SSM’s procedures concerning offsets. It is periodically revised 
according to international conditions. The most recent revision was of in 2003.  
This book helps both executives of defense companies and bureaucrats such as 
members from MSB to conform to Turkish offset practices. The handbook 
stresses direct offsets more than indirect ones and also deals with matters such as 
penalties for failure to follow these regulations, application in areas other than the 
defense industry and their coordination. In addition to this, in 1991, an Offset 
Department was established within SSM with the mission of overseeing offset 
agreements in Turkey.  
 There are seven criteria to fulfill offset obligations. These are the ratio of 
offset contracts, time for realizing offset agreements, the ratio of local 
contribution, penalties, the offset letter of intent, the resolution of disagreements 
and increasing the number of offsets. As of 2005, SSM began implementing offset 
agreements on the basis of their quality not quantity. Until that time, the number 
                                                 
210 MSB, Turkish Defense Industry Strategy, p.4  
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of offset agreements was regarded as a way to indicate success in obtaining 
international cooperation. However, with the professionalization of defense 
industry, looking at offset agreements from the perspective of quality became an 
important benchmark. The degree of offsets contribution to local industry is 
another point of reference for a good decision. However, the number of offsets is 
also mentioned in all articles and in interviews. According to statistics, until 2005, 
SSM signed 59 offset agreements. 18 of projects regarding offsets were 
concluded. 
  Undersecretary Murad Bayar underlined the utility of offsets as follows:   
 
[80%] of our defence companies’ exports are made through offset. If we didn’t 
have offset, we couldn’t achieve this. This accounts for the majority of the 
turnovers of both TAI and TEI and if we didn’t have this offset support these 
companies would likely be closed. Are we the only country doing this? No... Every 
country in Europe does this and Turkey must follow this method. It is essential for 
the survival of our companies, especially in a country such as ours, which realises 
most of its defence needs through imports. We have generated US$4.3 Billion in 
offsets to date. As a result of SSM projects we can now talk about the existence of 
a defence industry in Turkey. Those who have taken part in this process since the 
beginning can observe this.211
  
According to the former Undersecretary of SSM Dr. Ercan, offset was 
significant in terms of promoting more balanced trade. He stated that “[Turkey] 
procures 20 units equipment from outside in contrast with Turkey’s one unit of 
export. There is an imbalance that worth one to twenty. In the short term, we are 
trying to balance this inequality with offsets.”212 The purpose of offsets is to 
replace funds spent on imports with defense industry equipments. SSM has 
prioritized some areas for offset applications so that foreign partners can more 
easily comprehend Turkey’s needs in the area of defense equipments. In Turkey, 
when executive managers criticize offsets, they contend that Turkey did not 
                                                 
211 Murad Bayar “Opening Remarks”  
212 Prof.Dr. Ali Ercan, “Ulusal Savunma Sanayii’ne Doğru -Towards a National Defense Industry” 
Savunma ve Havacılık, Vol.3:1. 2000. 
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benefit from offsets that there have been no real gains from offsets. Ali Ercan also 
discussed this issue stating that Turkey had not fully obeyed the rules of offset. 
The companies were only focusing on real gains. As a result of this, when there 
were some overloaded duties, these industries did not fulfill their obligations. 
“For this reason, [defense companies] put forward cash payments, they did not 
follow regulations in full sense and the benefits to national policy did not occur in 
full sense.” 213 Despite this critique, the figure below depicts which national 
companies export in 2005 by using offsets.   
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Figure 4. The Scale of Offsets214
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4.2.6.1.Problems of Offset Administration 
 Another issue concerning offset usage is the development of technological 
and industrial infrastructure in the country. Developed countries with high-tech 
infrastructure can easily manipulate the new system’s advantages with the R&D 
process upgrading the technology that comes with offset requirements. However, 
in Turkey, this is not the case: Turkey did not devote enough funds to R&D. Not 
only were the funds inadequate, but national policy was not formulated. In 
addition to this, Turkish cyber parks, which are an area that can benefit from 
offsets, were only  established in 2001. 
Another problem concerning the improper use of offsets is the lack of 
independent and reliable technology assessment centers in Turkey. These centers 
are usually responsible for determining the life cycle of a product that will be 
procured through offset agreements. The procurement mechanism without such 
centers may not be able to determine life cycle properly. For example, some 
equipment that are at the beginning of their half life may be developed according 
to new technologies. In addition to this, their price will be less than that of another 
technology. In this case, the risk situation of such equipment enters into the 
decision making process. These assessment centers are entrusted with the task of 
detecting the risk aspect of this kind of weapons. “[In Turkey] the procurement of 
weapons is performed during the second life of these weapons both in direct 
procurement and in domestic procurement. The reason is that this type of 
mechanism does not take part in the procurement mechanism.”215  
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4.2.6.2. International Cooperation by Offsets 
As mentioned in the second chapter, offsets are one of the ways in which 
international cooperation takes place in defense sector. With the development of 
international defense market, cooperation became essential. Although 
participating in international consortiums and benefiting from this experience is 
not an easy task, any country with sufficient economic base can take part in these 
projects. According to SSM, Turkey’s aim to participate in such projects was to 
improve its local defense industry. Turkish defense industry strategy is based on 
obtaining its needs from the domestic industry. However, according to 
government officials, this should not disentangle Turkey the international market. 
Turkey started benefiting from the process of international cooperation with F-16 
projects. Murad Bayar, in a conference, emphasized that Turkey wants to continue 
to work with international counterparts as in the case of A400M. Six partners are 
cooperating in this project which will produce one hundred eighty aircraft. 
Moreover, he emphasized that 
 
[We] buy 10 aircraft and our share is 5-5.5%, this takes our contribution to 
Euro5.5 Billion. What do we get in return? Turkish industries have taken 
responsibility in the design of subsystems for the first time. In the A400M Project, 
a team of over 100 engineers are designing the central part of the aircraft body. 
The aircraft is designed by the consortium, but this part is under our responsibility 
and the detailed design is being drawn up in Turkey. The proportion of our 
contribution dictates our share from sales in the future, and this project totally 
supports our objectives. How? Our contribution return is 100% in this project, 
meaning we get back everything we have put in.216
 
4.2.7. SSM’s Export Policies 
 In developed countries, as mentioned in the first chapter, defense 
companies that export are supported by the government. For example, French 
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government/DGA did not stop arms exports to various Third World countries 
despite international embargoes against these countries. An instance of 
government support in the case of a developing country is that Brazilian exports 
to international arena sustained by Brazilian diplomatic representatives abroad. 
During its first phase, IMBEL, Brazil’s War Material Company, initiated the 
commercialization of exports by state. As a result of these efforts, Brazil 
strengthened its influence in its region. The export of armament is not interpreted 
only as an economic issue. The policy can also enable states to export political 
influence to an importing state. Turkey as an importing state was on the receiving 
end of such policies, during the establishment of its defense industry. 
Development of one’s own defense industry will make the country more 
independent from such influences. Moreover one of the aims of Turkish defense 
industry, as discussed in the second chapter, is to be strong enough to survive in a 
destabilized region. If SSM is successful in promoting export of the products of 
the domestic defense industry, Turkey will in turn be able to influence its region. 
Despite this, Turkish defense companies criticized SSM and other 
government agencies not to put emphasis on this issue. Turkish companies have 
exported their products to Third World countries on their own initiative. Yalçın 
Burcak, a former Undersecretary of SSM, stated that SSM’s contribution to the 
exporting companies was minimal when compared to the case of Western 
counterparts. SSM lent little support for assisting the attendance of these firms at 
international arms exhibitions. He also mentioned that there had been an initiative 
in cooperation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Undersecretariat of Treasury 
to analyze international exhibitions and to design Turkish exhibits accordingly. 
As a result of this initiative, SSM won two prizes during the IDEX’93 in Abu 
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Dhabi. A large number of Turkish firms participated in this exhibition. Studies 
had also been conducted concerning the possibility of diverting some portion of 
SSDF to provide assistance to exporting firms.217  
 
4.2.7.1. International Defense Exhibition (IDEF) 
Another innovation in the export policy was SSM’s organization of the 
International Defense Exhibition (IDEF) in Turkey. The expectation was that 
many international companies would attend the event.  The first IDEF was 
conducted in 1993. However, this exhibition did not satisfy the expectations of 
defense firms in Turkey. For example, the F-16 aircraft was not shown during the 
exhibition as a sign of the level of Turkish defense industry. Also, the number of 
participants was lower than expected. Despite these disadvantages, OTOKAR218’s 
performance at the exhibition was considered successful, in that it concluded 
agreements with Turkey’s gendarmerie force.219 Following this experience, SSM 
and TSKGV chose the route of professionalization to organize IDEF, which 
became a biennial event. TSKGV selected the main contractor to organization the 
exhibition by means of a tender.  The most recent IDEF220 took place in 2005. As 
the latest, IDEF 05 was yet more professionalized with various improvements 
being implemented.  
It was expected that professionalization would help make Turkey’s IDEF 
competitive among international defense exhibitions. The organizing committee 
also set up offices for attendees, in order to provide them with a place where they 
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219 Savunma ve Havacılık, OTOKAR’s Performance,  (Vol:4. 1,2003) 
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could discuss their products with potential buyers, also conclude agreements and 
hold ceremonial signings. Not only major defense companies but small defense 
companies221 as well participated in IDEF 05. To compare with   
 
[…] the exhibition in 2003, the number of attending countries increased by 27 
percent to 42. The number of firms increased by a percentage of 26 to 400. 
There were 218 commissions from 47 countries. Nine of them were at the level 
of the Minister of Defense; four of them were headed by the Chief of Staff.222
 
Besides IDEF, Turkish companies’ attendance to two international defense 
exhibitions is directly supported by SSM. These are IDEX and DSA223. These 
exhibitions are important for Turkish companies because Turkish exports are 
directed generally to Asia, Middle East, Gulf Region, Far East and North Africa. 
The most recent DSA took place in Malaysia in April 2006.  For the first time, 
thirty-one Turkish firms attended an international defense exhibition. Moreover, 
the cost of attending some prestigious European exhibitions is much higher than 
that of those just mentioned. 
 
4.2.7.2. SSM’s New Export Initiatives  
Another way of supporting exporting companies is through SSM conducting 
official visits to other countries. This is a new method which was implemented by 
Murad Bayar. The visits were designated as “Official Visits for Exports”, the first 
one made to Gulf countries on 2-11 October 2005. Besides Undersecretary Bayar 
and personnel from SSM, thirteen representatives of Turkish defense firms went 
on that trip. The countries where such visits will be made are determined, inter 
alia, according to Turkish foreign policy and international politics. “From this 
                                                 
221 These small companies did not directly produce defense goods. Rather their products were used 
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222 Ibid. p.85 
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perspective, Middle Eastern countries and especially Gulf countries were 
determined as priority countries for Turkish defense exports. We are also 
examining North Africa, Far East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe as important 
regions to be focused on.”224 During an interview, an official of SSM, Mahmut 
Şener speaking about the above-mentioned visit stated that the individuals they 
spoke with in Gulf countries were surprised by the improvement and capabilities 
of the Turkish defense industry.      
The latest official visit was conducted to Pakistan in 21 May 2006. Besides 
SSM, seventeen defense companies’ executives attended this trip. SSM concluded 
an agreement with the Pakistani Ministry of Defense. With this agreement, 
Aselsan and Havelsan would be able to export electronic warfare systems to 
Pakistan. It was also emphasized that “Pakistani officials are interested in Turkish 
high-tech electronic warfare systems. Pakistan, which devotes large funds to its 
defense, will be a productive market for Turkey.”225
 
4.2.8. SSM Personnel and the Appointment of the Undersecretary  
The SSM personnel are subject to the provisions of Civil Servants Law No: 
657. Concerning matters that require specialization, SSM can hire contractual 
personnel. “[…] Law No: 3238 allows the transfer of personnel from other public 
institutions and to the Undersecretariat on leave without salary and contract”226 
The Undersecratariat currently employs 246 personnel, of which 189 are 
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employed in project management groups and 57 in administration/technical 
support. 
The appointment of the undersecretary may at times become a power game 
between the military and the civilian decision makers. The undersecretaries have 
always been civilian.  However, it is possible for officers at the rank of captain or 
above to be selected as undersecretary. Military candidates are usually retired 
officers. The civilian undersecretaries have mostly been closely associated with 
the governments in power at the time of their appointment. For example, former 
SSM Undersecretary Vahit Erdem was known to be close to then President Turgut 
Özal.  
Appointments of military officers were depicted as the result of the 
military’s efforts to have an active role in the decisions of SSM regarding 
procurement issues. As Sarıibrahimoğlu emphasized “[the] appointment of two 
retired senior generals as SSM deputy undersecretaries was part of the military’s 
scheme to bring the SSM under its direct control.”227 For example, Prof. Ercan 
was appointed before the implementation of attack helicopter projects.  Another 
result of the appointment of Mr. Ercan was that “[h]is appointment may have 
meant dealing a serious blow at the very fundamental principle underlying the 
SSM which was established in 1985 to break a 50 year national public sector 
monopoly to encourage the local and foreign private sector.”228
 Moreover, Lale Sariibrahimoglu, who is an experienced journalist on 
defense matters, stated that the civilian character of SSM tended to decrease by 
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the appointment of retired generals and other military officers. 229 Regarding the 
same issue the Undersecretary Murad Bayar, states that military personnel were 
working closely with the SSM because of their expertise on the technological 
aspects of the projects. As Jenkins noted Turkey is still quite poor regarding 
civilian expertise in defense matters230. 
 
4.3. The Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF) 
 
4.3.1. The Contents of Fund 
As part of the effort to develop Turkey’s defense industry, through the 
establishment of SSM, a special type of fund was placed under the authority of 
SSM.  As indicated in the SSM’s book “[This] fund acts as a highly flexible 
mechanism to guarantee a constant flow of financial resources, free from 
bureaucratic formalities and under the full and independent control of SSM 
itself.”231 The revenues of this fund are annual appropriations from the national 
budget revenues from the sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products; 
transfers from the Turkish Armed Forces Support Foundation;  from national 
lottery and other forms of gambling and betting;  from all kinds of transfers from 
other funds; from the fuel consumption tax; from income and corporate taxes; 
from the fund’s own assets; from the military service compensation fees; 
donations and aids; from light arms sales and foreign credits. According to the 
decisions of SSIK, the payments from this fund are made as credit payments, 
contract payments, and direct procurement payments. “In this context, payments 
from the Fund are as follows: transfers to the national budget; transfers to SSM 
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administrative budget; payments to the SSM partnership; investments towards 
nationalization; contract payments; direct procurement payments.”232
  The items that are indicated by law may be changed or removed according 
to the government’s decisions. For example, revenues from the fuel consumption 
tax no longer go into the fund. “[The fund] has acquired 1.7 billion dollar income 
from this tax over 14 years. In other words it represented 16% of total income. 
Beside this, there are SSM’s property holdings. However, with the decision made 
in 1998, this income was also removed.”233 Such changes have been made as the 
result of economic problems in Turkey. 
 In 2001 the rate of exchange in Turkey decreased dramatically affecting 
the receipts and expenses of SSDF. In order to compensate for the decrease in the 
SSDF’s revenues, funds were transferred from the budget of MSB and TSKGV. 
“[M]oreover, because of the crisis, the government was unable to increase the 
SSDF by adding new resources.” 234 In addition, when the entire annual fund is 
not spent, the remaining money is kept in the Treasury as dollars and this amount 
is transferred to the following year.  It is because outlay for the procurement of 
weapons is generally made in terms of foreign exchange and by this the value of 
the money is preserved for following next year.     
  The SSDF is exempted from the supervision of Court of Audit. However, 
a type of commission was established inside SSM in order to review the 
expenditures of the fund. Members of the committee are from the Prime Ministry, 
Ministry of Economy, and MSB. As Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroğlu emphasized 
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“[i]n addition to the government control, the Auditors of the Court of Public 
Accounts audit on behalf of Parliament the proper use of all of the items of the 
central government’s consolidated budget to ensure that they are used in 
accordance with the Budget Law.” 235
 
4.3.2. SSDF and Defense Budget Calculation  
  Another issue concerning this fund is its implications for the defense 
budget. Turkey has always been criticized for having a very large defense 
expenditure compared with other NATO countries. The SSDF, however, was not 
included in these assessments. As an extra budgetary fund, the expenditures from 
this fund were not added to the national budget statistics. “Finally in the case of 
defense expenditures partly financed by extra-budget sources, like the Defense 
Industry Support Fund of Turkey, actual defense expenditures are underestimated 
by the defense expenditures item in the government budget (i.e. the budget of the 
Defense Ministry).”236 However, incorrect estimations of the defense budget are 
not only the result of the SSDF being an extra-budgetary fund.  
 
Within the context of Turkey’s highly inflationary financial environment and 
ongoing revisions introduced into the government’s budgetary accounts, 
measurement of the relative as well as the absolute size of national defense 
expenditures poses a number of difficult statistical issues […]237        
 
4.3.3. Changes in the Structure of SSDF 
 Along with the latest changes in Turkish administrative system in order to 
harmonize with EU laws, Turkey has also tried to arrange its defense budget 
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according to the EU practice. In European countries, having extra-budgetary 
funds for defense is not a general practice. Moreover, these countries have also 
decreased their general defense spending whereas this is not the case in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, for the first time in 2004, defense spending ranked second in the 
2004 budget. The largest government expenditure was on education.  
  This position seems to change. “Nevertheless it is almost certain that 
Turkey will return to high defense spending levels in 2005”238  Moreover, 
according to speeches delivered by top commanders, Turkish threat perception 
from its vicinity is increasing. For example, the Chief of General Staff, Yaşar 
Büyükanit, emphasized that “Turkey is facing both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
threats”. Tehran’s ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, ongoing conflict with 
Kurdish nationalist and PKK terror, political turmoil in Iraq had policy-makers to 
increase the ratio of Turkish defense budget in 2007.    
 
Turkey […] spends more than 3.7 billion for defense procurement annually. 
The defense ministry spends about 2.7 billion or about one-third of its entire 
budget for new equipment and modernization program […] In some cases, 
the Treasury also contributes funds for defense. But since Turkey’s budgetary 
spending is subject to the consent of IMF due to a stand-by loan agreement, 
the Treasury’s financing of defense program may be limited to a few high-
priority contracts.239
 
 
  The status of SSDF was altered according to EU reform packages. 
Previously, SSDF was exempt from the parliamentary control. The Court of 
Audit, which is responsible for examining public expenses, could not control the 
SSDF. Instead of this mechanism, a body was established inside SSM to be 
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responsible for SSDF’s oversight. However, in order to harmonize its structure 
with European laws, Turkey changed this practice. The changes in Law on the 
Court of Auditors,  
 
[E]nables Court of Audits, on behalf of TGNA and its inspection committees, 
to scrutinize all types of public expenditures, the revenues, expenditures, and 
property of institutions without any exemptions and without exempting any 
institute, from being accountable. Then, the Court of Audits reports to the 
related Parliamentary Committees240. 
 
 Not only the changes in the Law on the Court of Auditors but also the 
changes in the Law on Public Financial Management and Control Law affected 
the status of SSDF. SSDF was formulated as an extra-budgetary fund in order not 
to be affected by the economic situation in the state.  However, with the changes 
in the Law on Public Financial Management, “extra-budgetary funds and defense 
funds are to be brought into the defense budget and into the overall state budget. 
Therefore, these funds are subject to auditing not only by the Directorate General 
of Foundations and the Court of Audits but also by the parliament now.”241 
However, this fund will in fact not totally be dissolved. Despite these 
amendments, the fund will continue under the auspices of SSM and there will be 
some financial flexibility.  
  These financial flexibilities have to do with the expenditures of the fund. 
The revenues of the fund will not change. However, the spending from this fund 
will be under some new constraints. The first financial flexibility is the need to 
keep the fund in the form of foreign exchange. In Turkey, in general, no public 
administration is permitted to keep its funds as foreign exchange.  However, if 
SSM were not allowed to do this, it would go bankrupt.  
                                                 
240 Ayşe Nilufer Narlı, Aligning Civil-Military Relations in Turkey, p. 13 
241 Ibid. p.14 
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  The second flexibility is needed in order to be able to transfer money from 
one year to the next year. Bayar described the necessity of this flexibility by 
pointing out that “[%1] of this fund is for SSM’s administrative spending, %99 is 
for its project. SSM administration could assess its administrative spending but it 
cannot calculate the value of projects in the next year”242 These flexibilities are 
granted to SSM.  
  An additional issue regarding defense spending in Turkey concerns the 
public reaction to the high level of spending. Turkey is ranked among the world’s 
first fifteen countries in terms of defense spending. However, the general reaction 
to the large defense expenditures is not as it is expected. As Lanier pointed out 
 
[High] defense expenditures are rarely challenged by Turkish people, who 
expect the military not only to protect them from foreign threats but also to 
intervene and restore order if a corrupt civilian government goes astray. For 
many Turks, defense spending is more important than social services, since 
the military is viewed as principal guardian of Turkish identity.243  
 
  Until 2001, it was the radical groups (radical leftists) who opposed to the 
high defense budget came from radical groups. With the economic crisis of 2001, 
academicians, journalists started to question not only proportion of the military 
expenses but also civilian control over these expenses. For example, during an 
interview with Neşe Düzel244, an economist Osman Ulugay emphasized that 
 
[M]ilitary expenses must be subject to inspection like other expenses. I 
do not agree to the statement that every sent spend in defense is for the 
well-being of motherland. We should discuss if these defense expenses 
are rational or if there are alternatives to them. I do not trust the 
publicly announced figures on the defense budget. Because not all 
military expenses are transparent. Nobody knows the accurate amount 
                                                 
242 Interview with the author 
243 Stephen Lanier, “Military Trends in Turkey: Strengths&Weakness”, p.5  
244 Neşe Düzel is a journalist working at Radikal newspaper 
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of the money spend on military expenses. Military expenses cause 
higher public spending that is detrimental to anti-inflationary policy. 245  
 
 
  An external impetus for this reaction could be underlined as Turkish 
integration process to the EU. TGNA has amended several reform packages for 
the harmonization of Turkish practice to the EU laws. The seventh package and 
tenth package were mainly elaborated on civil-military relations. Most of the exit 
guarantees246 for military in the constitution was lifted by these packages.  These 
reforms created more democratic sphere than before. As a result of this, most of 
the intellectuals criticized high military spending and civil-military relations more 
freely.   
  For example, in his column247, Güngör Uras, journalist, reacted to 
spending on AWACS by equating it to the money necessary for the construction 
of forty factories worth one billion dollars. Other examples can be listed as 
follows: 
[A] columnist Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnsel wrote another article on the need for 
transparency in military expenses and democratic control of military 
budgeting. Hasan Cemal, one of the leading columnists has also joined the 
voices and wrote an article asking about “the military to be under civilian 
control”. Then in 2004, the leading union KESK (Kamu Emekçileri 
Sendikası-The Union of Public Workers) published a report criticizing the 
2004 budget by pointing out the problem of the lack of transparency in 
military budgeting and the lack of parliamentary control of defense budgeting 
in practice. The second point it made was the inverse relationship between the 
lower proportion of the money allocated for the education and health expenses 
and the higher level of military expenses.248        
 
                                                 
245 Nese Duzel, “Yine askeri harcamalar-Military Expenses Again”, Radikal, 10 July 2000.  
246 Exit guarantees are the legal ways by which military can control politics. Ergun Özbudun,  
Contemporary Turkish Political Challenges to Democratic Consolidation,  (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1999) 
 
247 Güngör Uras, “40 Fabrika 1 Milyar$, 4 AWACS 1.5 Milyar$- 40 Factory 1 Billion$; 4 
AWACS-1.5 Billion $” Milliyet, 30-04-2003 
248 Ayse Nilufer Narlı, Aligning Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Transparency Building in 
Defense Sector and EU Reforms, Available online at: 
http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg9_taf_110.pdf  
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 Despite these reactions, the SSDF has gathered 15.7 billion US dollar 
since its foundation. From this revenue, 14.3 billion dollar till 2005 and 324 
million dollar in 2005 was spent for the SSM projects. Besides this, 23.44 million 
Turkish liras were budgeted for the expenses in 2006.249 The SSDF’s revenues 
and costs till 2003 depicted in the figure below.   
 
    Figure 5. The SSDF in 2003250
 
4.4. SSM’s New Program to Reorganize Defense Industry in 
Turkey: Turkish Defense Holding         
 
 
Under its new undersecretary Murad Bayar, one of the projects SSM 
launched is the reorganization of the defense industry in Turkey. Bayar indicated 
that the scale of Turkish defense companies is the most important problem to deal 
                                                 
249 TBMM Bütçe Tasarısı, 11 November 2005, Available online at: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/butce/htm/pbk11112005.htm   
250 Vecdi Gönül, “Hedef: İstikrar ve Güvenlik İçin Güçlü Savunma-Target: Strong Defense for 
Stability and Security” Savunma ve Havacılık, Vol.98:4, 2005, p.20 
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with. This view was also backed up by the Minister of Defense, Vecdi Gönül. In 
their interview, the scale of Turkish defense firms should be large enough to 
compete in international defense sector as well as to meet the requirements of 
TAF.  
 
[O]ur defense industry, with its existing capabilities, is able to meet only 25% 
of the modernization requirements TAF. If we do not develop approaches 
somewhat different from those at we have been applying up to now in the 
determination of the three principal components in the field of defense 
industry, being requirement, procurement method and sectoral structuring, we 
will not be able to increase this 25%local content level.251
 
  Mr. Vecdi Gönül underlined that “[t]he main problem of our defense 
industry is the scale. Today the products and services that our firms have 
produced are equal to 1 million dollars and this amount is equal to a small-scale 
foreign firm.”252 The AKP government made an attempt in 2006 to solve this 
problem through the consolidation of firms in Turkish defense industry. This 
program is known as the “Defense Industry Reorganization Project” or “Turkish 
Defense Holding”. The firms in which SSM and TSKGV are shareholders will be 
merged according to this project. The reason for this consolidation is to create a 
viable infrastructure based on high technology in defense industry. 
 
4.4.1. The Project 
   The first phase, the consolidation of TSKGV’s and SSM’s firms has been 
initiated. They will be administered by a single center. This firm will be a holding 
company.  The first phase started with the consolidation of the domestic 
aerospace and system integration sectors. For this purpose, TAI and TUSAŞ were 
                                                 
251 Murad Bayar, “Turkish Defense Industry”, NATO’s Nations, Vol.4.1, 2005, p.23 
252 Vecdi Gönül, “Hedef: İstikrar ve Güvenlik İçin Güçlü Savunma-Target: Strong Defense for 
Stability and Security” Savunma ve Havacılık, p.15 
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merged. On 12 January 2005, TUSAS acquired those shares of TAI that were 
owned by the foreign firms. The result of this collaboration is expected to create a 
kind of “Aerospace Center” in Turkey. The next phase in this project will be to 
encourage synergy in the private sector and the supplier firms.  
  When this project is completed, defense firms in Turkey will be largely 
owned by Turkish corporations. In fact, similar solutions successfully tried in the 
Western countries. European countries consolidated their national firms under one 
umbrella and called this approach as “National Championship”. These national 
firms will protect European countries from possible US’ hegemony in their 
defense markets. This new Turkish plan can be seen as following the European 
prototype. 
  Another question that was raised concerned the status of the MKEK. The 
MKEK was reshaped as part of the EU reform packages. The corporate body was 
abolished and it was linked to a Directorate General. However, as part of the new 
project, MKEK will also be integrated to the new holding. “The integration of 
MKEK into the National Defense Industry infrastructure will be realized in the 
second phase of the SSYY Project, and certain evaluation studies are being 
carried out.”253
  Not only TAI and TUSAŞ but also other semi-government owned 
companies such as Aselsan, Havelsan and Roketsan will also be brought under the 
roof of the new company. This new structure will be in the form of holding 
company and it will be directed by a professional CEO. Upon the completion of 
the project, according to Mr. Bayar, shares of the company will also be offered on 
the stock market. According to experts, if this structure is processed regularly, 
                                                 
253 Murad Bayar, “SSM and Its Twentieth Anniversay” NATO’s Nations, Vol. 4:1, 2005, p.8  
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than Turkey will meet the expenses of main systems in the ratio of %50.  Another 
feature of this holding company is that its structure will not be in the form of state 
economic enterprise. The firms under the holding company will be able to act 
unilaterally during tenders. “The administration of holding which has 
approximately 500-600 million dollars in capital will be given to the current 
shareholders of the firms. However, in order to give the company a professional 
management system, a CEO254, who is an expert on these issues, will work with 
an extended authority.”255 After the integration of system, 15% of the company 
shares will be sold on the stock market. 
  However, along with the new project, new questions have arisen. One 
concerns the administration of this new holding. Murad Bayar stated that “The 
state sector integration should be well defined. The state’s intervention should be 
made in a systematic way. In this proposed administration, we have taken some 
precautions regarding state intervention.”256 One is the administration of this new 
holding.  
  Another criticism is that this company will monopolize the defense 
industry. Since it will be a large firm owned by state organizations, it was also 
believed that competition during tenders could be spoiled. Regarding this issue, it 
was stated that there should be no competition within the country. The 
competition should be global. While Europe and America have only three major 
defense firms, having twenty firms in Turkey is not logical. He added that private 
firms will have an important role in equipping the land forces. The new firm will 
                                                 
254 It was decided that Ayhan Gerçeker, former Vice-President of ASELSAN, was attended as the 
CEO of new firm. 
255 Barkın Şık, “Savunmada Dev Şirket Modeline Geçiliyor- Large Company Model Will Be 
Applicable In Defense Industry”, Milliyet, 22-06-2005 
256 Murad Bayar, “Yapacak Çok İşimiz Var-We Have Lots To Do” Military Science and 
Intelligence, Vol.7, 2005, p.41 
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not enter this sector. As a result of this, there will be room for private firms in the 
market. Moreover, SSM will also encourage these firms to collaborate among 
themselves. The reason is that unless they are able to attain a larger scale, private 
firms will not be able to compete in the international arena. Small and Medium 
Size Enterprises in the sector will also benefit from the new system. “In large 
projects, the large firms will act as the main contractor and 50% of the project will 
be opened to the SME’s. I will guarantee this to the SMEs.”257 He gave the 
example of IAI and Elbit firms in Israel, stating that IAI is similar to the new 
Turkish Defense Holding. Elbit, a small firm, has despite this grown during the 
course of ten years and is now able to compete with IAI. It can similarly be said 
that the aim of new firm in Turkey is not to compete with to their detriment, but 
rather to improve the position of the entire Turkish defense industry.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
257 Interview with the author 
 142
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The defense industry is the main branch of the economy in a state. It has a 
special status because of its linkage with national security. Despite liberalization 
in the world economy, states are hesitant to apply these principles to their defense 
industries. With the evolution of states and changes in military strategies, defense 
industries have also been reshaped according to the needs of the armed forces. 
However, one factor that has remained constant is the importance of technology 
to the defense sector. This factor can also be classified as a problem for a country. 
As a result of this, most developed countries have devoted a large amount of 
funding to R&D. International cooperation has been applied as a way to reduce 
the costs of weapon production. The types of cooperation in the defense industry 
literature may be listed as international collaboration, the usage of offsets and 
licensed production.  
Another way to decrease the cost of R&D is to export. However, powerful 
countries use arms export as a way to gain influence over other states. The most 
important examples occurred during the Cold War. This situation was not 
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welcomed by any sovereign country. Western European countries, as a reaction to 
the US’ influence over their defense industries, set up their own industrial 
complexes.  
Arms procurement mechanisms in the states are also another factor for the 
development of a defense industry. States generally prefer to set up an 
independent mechanism for the performance of this duty.  These agencies are 
composed of civilian bureaucrats who are knowledgeable on this issue. Moreover, 
these civilians co-act with the military in order to fulfill military’s demands. The 
main function of these bodies is to act as a bridge between defense companies and 
requiring agencies. The establishment of these agencies will facilitate states’ 
influence over the defense market in a coherent way like in France, the DGA. 
Their roles in defense markets and their influences are analyzed in this thesis.    
 The main theme in this thesis is the development of Turkish defense 
industry and the role of SSM. The Turkish Republic, despite being the successor 
of a strong empire, did not inherit a substantial defense industry. However, with 
the industrialization period in Anatolia, the Turkish government focused on an 
indigenous defense industry. For this purpose, one third of the budget was 
devoted to R&D process in the 1920s. Private companies were also set up during 
this process. As a result of the devotion of money to the R&D, Turkey could 
produce sophisticated systems, especially in the aircraft sector. 
 In spite of these improvements during the early Republican period, the 
Turkish defense industry entered a period of stagnation because of NATO and US 
aid to Turkey. The weapon systems that were acquired by this aid were more 
profitable than those from domestic production. As a result of this, only 
indigenous maintenance and continuance services have been kept in Turkey.  
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 However, the reliance on US/NATO aid did not go on long enough. In 
1964, President Lyndon Johnson prevented Turkey from landing its troops in 
Cyprus. After this crisis, the motto in the Turkish defense sector became “produce 
your aircraft yourself”. Several defense companies started to function in this area, 
such as ASELSAN, OTOMARSAN and so on. Moreover, a military foundation 
for domestic defense industry in Turkey, the Armed Forces Foundation was 
established. As a result of these developments, the Turkish defense industry 
entered in a boom period.  
 In the 1980s, the Turkish economic structure was overhauled. 
Liberalization entered the Turkish market. Private companies would act in the 
defense market, which had been previously forbidden by Turkish law. In order to 
control its defense market, the Turkish government decided to set up a civil 
agency, the SSM, in 1985. The SSM would be able to act as its counterparts in the 
world. Besides domestic changes, international conjuncture also affected the 
development of the defense industry in Turkey. The post-Cold War environment 
led Turkey to restructure its defense policy. As a result of this, the modernization 
of the TAF became a must. Military elites emphasized that these efforts should 
have been met by domestic weapons production and as a result, defense 
companies intensified their production.   
Despite these improvements, there are still some problems regarding the 
defense industry in Turkey. These failures may be summarized as follows; duality 
in the arms procurement system, the lack of investment to R&D, the lack of 
categorization of defense firms, competition policy during the tenders, Turkish 
defense companies’ inability to produce software systems, structural deficiencies 
in defense market, the lack of independent test centers, the lack of governmental 
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support for exporting companies and so on. Despite some improvements in the 
defense market, such as the categorization of the defense market, these failures 
still occur in the Turkish defense market.   
The SSM is also responsible for the procurement of weapon systems. In 
order to conclude a defense agreement, low costs for the projects is the main 
criteria in Turkey. Another criterion is the proposal’s level of degree. This 
criterion is related to the proposal’s investment in the local defense industry and 
the technical sophistication of the system. Moreover, as a procurement agency, 
the SSM focuses on the projects’ contribution to Turkish defense industry. 
However, the agency in the MSB responsible for arms procurement places 
emphasis on the low cost of the proposal. This is also indication of duplicity 
during the arms procurement process.    
Technology is an indispensable element of the defense industry. 
Technoparks are a way to intensify technological improvement in a country. 
Turkey realized their importance early on. Despite this, the SSM tries to configure 
Turkey’s technological policies. For example, the procurement policies have been 
reshaped by putting emphasis on technology. However, there are still some 
problems regarding R&D in Turkey, such as a lack of funds for R&D.    
Another important policy that the SSM oversees in the defense market is 
the offsets. During the interviews conducted for this thesis, the SSM 
Undersecretaries put emphasis on the utility of offsets. They emphasized that 
offsets are a way to balance trade for weapons production. However this concept 
is not imbibed by Turkish defense companies’ executives.  
These policies, whether successful or not, enabled Turkish defense 
industry to improve its capacity. After the year of 2000, there have been some 
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positive steps to intensify these attempts. For example, Turkish defense industry 
has started to produce unique weapon systems. Coordination inside the sector and 
some positive developments regarding civil-military relations empowered Turkish 
defense industry capacity. It could also export its products. However, the level of 
these exports is not satisfying when we considered international defense industry.  
According to governmental elites, the main problem within the Turkish 
defense market is the scale of defense companies. The SSM initiated a new policy 
to overcome this deficiency. The small scale companies would be gathered under 
a holding company. The military is the shareholder of these small scale 
companies. It was foreseen that this company would be able to act in international 
defense market. 
Besides these developments, not only the SSM but also the Turkish 
military has a role in the development of the defense industry. Despite being a 
civilian body, the SSM is under pressure from the military. For example, the 
undersecretaries are appointed as a result of their closeness to the army. The 
military also might have influence during the arms procurement process.  
To conclude, the development of the defense industry is an early 
phenomenon in Turkey. Not only the aim of self-sufficiency in weapons 
production but also the Turkish geographical position creates an underlying 
tension for developing a domestic defense industry. Turkey has been facing 
several threats within its vicinity, such as Tehran’s ambition to acquire WMD, 
political turmoil in Iraq, crises situation in the Caucasus, and so on. However, 
Turkish companies have not yet been able to fulfill this aim. Some policies such 
as establishing the SSM resemble the efforts of Turkish political elite. The SSM 
tries to act as a bridge between defense industrialists and government. It also 
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formulates mandatory policies for an indigenous defense industry. However, there 
should be more efforts to develop the Turkish defense market. Formulating 
national policies regarding defense companies, devoting funds to R&D, 
decreasing the level of arms procurement from outside, intensifying relationships 
between the requiring agency (military) and the manufacturing side (defense 
companies), increasing the level of arms export and co-acting with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for these exports, and putting emphasis on the production of 
national software systems can be listed as major reforms needed to upgrade the 
Turkish defense industry.    
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